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WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
VIII. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. Affirmative Action Requirements for Government Subcontractors:
Statutory Authority for Executive Order 11,246
Presidents of the United States have issued executive orders to pre-
vent companies that perform work for the federal government from
using discriminatory hiring practices.1 President Johnson issued Ex-
ecutive Order 11, 246 (the Order) to forbid government contractors and
subcontractors from using discriminatory hiring practices and to re-
quire contractors to take affirmative action to ensure equal employ-
ment opportunities for minorities.2 Since the President cannot legis-
' Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt issued an anti-discrimination Executive Order during World War II. Exec. Order
No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation). The order required all defense contractors to
include in government contracts a covenant not to discriminate against employees because
of race, color, creed, or national origin. Id In 1943, Roosevelt ordered that all government
contracts include the anti-discrimination clause. Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280
(1938-1943 Compilation). In 1951, President Truman created the Committee on Government
Contract Compliance to enforce the non-discrimination contract provisions. Exec. Order No.
10,308 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-1953 Compilation). In 1954, President Eisenhower extended the
provisions imposed on government contractors to government subcontractors. Exec. Order
No. 10,557, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1954-1958 Compilation). President Kennedy expanded the anti-
discrimination Executive Order program by requiring contractors to include affirmative ac-
tion clauses in government contracts. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Com-
pilation). In 1963, Executive Order 11,114 expanded the Executive Order program to include
all federally assisted contracts. Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963
Compilation).
2 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1976) [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order 11,246]. Executive Order 11,246 cites no ex-
press statutory authority for its issuance. See Exec. Order 11,246 supra. The preface to the
Order states the Order was issued by virtue of the authority vested in the President of the
United States through the Constitution and statutes of the United States. Id
Executive Order 11,246 regulates employment practices concerning federal
employees, federal contracts, and federally assisted contracts. Id The regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to the Order require all contractors to include an equal employment op-
portunity clause in each government contract and in each contract with a subcontractor. Id.
The equal employment opportunity clause provides that the employer will not discriminate
against any employee or applicant regarding race, color, religion, or national origin, and
that the employer shall take affirmative action to ensure minority hiring. Id. Executive
Order 11,375 expanded the equal employment opportunity clause to include a prohibition
against sex discrimination. Exec. Order 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
Under Executive Order 11,246 federal contractors and. subcontractors must report
their hiring practices to the government. Exec. Order 11,246 supra. Bidders on federal con-
tracts state affirmative action goals in their bids. Id Contractors and subcontractors with a
government contract of more than $10,000 also are subject to the affirmative action regula-
tions. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 (1980). Failure to comply with the Executive Order can result in
severe sanctions. Exec. Order 11,246 supra. The Secretary of Labor may publish the names
of contractors and subcontractors that have failed to comply, may enjoin violations, and may
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late,' the Supreme Court has stated that application of Executive
Order 11,246 to a particular contractor or subcontractor requires a
Congressional grant of authority.4 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Friedman,5 the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue whether an in-
surance company for government contractors is a subcontractor re-
quired to compy with the affirmative action provisions of Executive
Order 11,246.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) underwrote workmen's
compensation insurance for several companies that performed govern-
ment contracts.6 Liberty provided blanket coverage for all employees of
the insured companies whether or not the employees performed work
under a government contract or subcontract.7 In October 1977, the
Department of Labor informed Liberty that as a subcontractor within
recommend that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission institute an action under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1976). Exec. Order 11,246 supra. In
addition, the Secretary has authority to prosecute offenders for furnishing false informa-
tion, to cancel, terminate, or suspend any contract, and to prohibit other federal agencies
from contracting with the non-complying contractors. Id.
The Department of Labor has proposed regulations that would keep the affirmative
action program intact, but would change several procedures under the Order. See 46 FED.
REG. 42968 (1981). The regulation would consolidate Executive Order 11,246 with other pro-
grams which the Office of Federal Contract Compliance administers. IM at 42968. The
Labor Department proposes to raise the threshold contract size which triggers written af-
firmative action requirements to $50,000. Id. at 42979. The purpose of the proposals is to
reduce government paperwork and to save taxpayer dollars. Id.
' See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (Congress has
exclusive lawmaking power under Constitution).
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979). In Chrysler, the Chrysler Cor-
poration, as a party to numerous government contracts, was required to comply with Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246. Id. at 286. The Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs (OFFCP) ordered Chrysler to furnish to the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) information regarding the status of the Chrysler affirmative action program. Id. The
DLA was the designated agency that monitored Chrysler's employment practices. Id. As
Executive Order 11,246 permits, OFFCP made available for public inspection records of
Chrysler discovered pursuant to the Order. Id at 287. Third parties, through the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 (1976), requested the DLA to release information
pertaining to Chrysler's Newark, Delaware assembly plant. Id The Chrysler Corporation
objected to the disclosure because the information involved trade secrets and confidential
business data. Id. at 294-95. Chrysler argued that the Trade Secrets Act, 78 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976), protected disclosure unless the disclosure was authorized by law. Id The govern-
ment argued that the OFFCP regulations had the force and effect of law and permitted
disclosure. Id. at 303. The Supreme Court looked to the Federal Property & Administrative
Services Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471 to 493 (1976), Titles VI & VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976),. the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-17 (1976) (amending Ti-
tle VII), and general executive authority to find statutory authority for the OFFCP regula-
tions issued pursuant to Executive Order 11,246. Id. at 304-06. The Court held that no
federal statute reasonably contemplated the release of the trade secrets or confidential
business data. Id at 306.
639 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1981).
6 Id at 166.
'Id.
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the meaning of Executive Order 11,246, Liberty was subject to the affir-
mative action requirements of the Order.' Liberty sought a declaratory
judgment in federal district court contesting the company's classifica-
tion as a subcontractor subject to the affirmative action regulations.9
The district court held that Liberty was a subcontractor within the
meaning of Executive Order 11,2461° and found statutory authority for
application of regulations promulgated under the Order to Liberty."
Liberty appealed to the Fourth Circuit."
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court because the court
found no statutory authority for application of Executive Order 11,246 to
Liberty." Although the Fourth Circuit concluded that Liberty was a sub-
contractor, the court did not find congressional approval for application
of the Order to an insurance company that underwrote workmen's com-
pensation policies for federal contractors. Since Executive Order 11,246
had no express congressional authorization,16 the Fourth Circuit 7 sought
Id. Under Executive Order 11,246, the Secretary of Labor can take necessary steps
to enforce the Order. Exec. Order 11,246, supra note 2. The Secretary of Labor has
delegated his authority to enforce the Order to the OFFCP. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1980).
9 See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 485 F. Supp. 695, 697-98 (D. Md.
1977).
"' Id. at 703-08. The district court noted the issue whether a workmen's compensation
insurer was a government subcontractor was an issue of first impression. Id. at 700. In
Liberty Mutual, the district court stated that the term "subcontractors" has been construed
liberally to include a research laboratory, a company which provided security services and
transfer funds for government contractors, and a company which provided training films
and other materials and services used to meet the affirmative action requirements imposed
on all government contractors. Id. at 707-08. The district court stated that other "subcon-
tractors" included a title insurance company, a company which assembled computers and
trained programmers to facilitate the performance of government contracts, and a company
which obtained mortgages and commercial loans necessary to enable the prime contractor
to have the financing needed to perform a government contract. Id at 708.
1 Id. at 716. The district court in Liberty Mutual found statutory authority for ap-
plication of Executive Order 11,246 in the Federal Property & Administrative Services Act,
40 U.S.C. §§ 471 to 493 (1976), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1976), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to
2000e-17 (1976). 485 F. Supp. at 708-16.
639 F.2d at 166.
Id. at 166-68.
' Id. at 167.
Id. at 166, 168.
18 See note 2 supra.
17 639 F.2d at 168-72. The Fourth Circuit in Library Mutual did not decide whether
Congress could require insurance companies providing workmen's compensation insurance
to federal 'contractors to comply with the affirmative action requirements of Executive
Order 11,246. Id. The Court did decide, however, whether Congress had extended to the ex-
ecutive branch the authority to apply the Order to Liberty. Id. The Fourth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown for possible statutory authority for
Executive Order 11,246. Id. at 168-69 n.10; see note 4 supra. The government contended that
it had no burden to identify a specific statutory source for Executive Order 11,246 because
Congress generally had approved the Executive Order Program. 639 F.2d at 168-69 n.10.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that a specific congressional grant was necessary to authorize
application of the Order to Liberty. Id.
. [Vol. XXXIX
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but could not find legislation that reasonably contemplated the regula-
tions issued pursuant to Executive Order 11,246.8
The Fourth Circuit rejected Liberty's argument that Liberty was
not a government subcontractor.'9 Liberty contended that the regula-
tions apply to a particular subcontractor only when a contractor has no
alternative but employ that subcontractor.20 Since contractors can self-
insure their projects, Liberty contested its subcontractor status because
no company was required to use Liberty's services. 2'1 The Fourth Circuit
disagreed with Liberty's argument and held that a company was a sub-
contractor if the company's services were legally necessary." Since all
states statutorily require workmen's compensation insurance,2 the
" 639 F.2d at 172. Since the Fourth Circuit in Liberty Mutual did not find statutory
authority for application of the Order to Liberty, the court did not address Liberty's alter-
native contentions. Id. at 166. Liberty had asserted that the government could not bind
Liberty to a contractual obligation without Liberty's consent, and that even if the Ex-
ecutive Order applied to Liberty the Order constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the executive branch. Id Liberty probably would not have prevailed on the
consent argument because the government has broad authority to determine the conditions
of government contracts. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940)
(government has power to fix terms and conditions of contract with contracting party);
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154; 1161 (S.D. Ill. 1971), afrd, 471
F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1972) (government has unrestricted power to determine conditions of
federal contracts). Once a party contracts with the government that party becomes subject
to the government's conditions. United States v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d
459, 469 15th Cir. 1977), vacated, 436 U.S. 942 (1978) (lack of consent to government contract
provisions no defense for failure to fulfill obligations of government regulations).
,9 639 F.2d at 167.
Id. The regulations promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 define subcon-
tract as:
[A]ny agreement or arrangement between a contractor and any person (in
which the parties do not stand in the relationship of an employer and an
employee):
(1) For the furnishing of supplies or services or for the use of real or personal
property, including lease arrangements, which, in whole or in part, is necessary to
the performance of any one or more contracts; or
(2) Under which any portion of the contractor's obligation under any one or
more contracts is performed, undertaken, or assumes.
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3 (1980).
Liberty argued that the term "is necessary" referred to "any agreement" under the
regulations. 639 F.2d at 167. Thus, Liberty asserted that the agreement with the subcon-
tractor had to be necessary to constitute a subcontract. Id. The Liberty Mutual court inter-
preted "is necessary" to refer to "for the furnishing of supplies and services" because a'con-
tractor rarely is forced to hire a particular subcontractor. Id.
" 639 F.2d at 167; see note 20 supra.
" 639 F.2d at 167.
, Id. The states within the Fourth Circuit statutorily require workmen's compensa-
tion insurance. See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (1981) (employers are required to provide
workmen's compensation insurance); MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 15 (1979) (employer must
provide workmen's compensation insurance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1979) (presumption
that all employers and employees are under Workmen's Compensation Act); S.C. CODE §
65.1-23 (1980) (employers presumed to accept provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act);
VA. CODE § 65.1-23 (1980) (employers presumed to accept provisions of Workmen's Compen-
sation Act).
1982]
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Fourth Circuit concluded that Liberty was providing a legally necessary
service subject to the regulations.24
After concluding that Liberty was a subcontractor, the Fourth Cir-
cuit sought statutory authority for application of the Order to Liberty.'
Since Executive Order 11,246 has no express congressional authoriza-
tion,26 the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Federal Property &
Administrative Services Act (the Procurement: Act) implied authority
for application of the Order to LibertyY The Fourth Circuit examined
.24 639 F.2d at 167.
25 Id
I See note 2 supra.
639 F.2d at 169-71. Congress' purpose under the Procurement Act is to provide the
federal government an economical and efficient system for the procurement and supply of
personal property and non-personal services. 40 U.S.C. § 471 (1976). The Procurement Act
also provides for the economic and efficient use of available government property, surplus
property, and government records. Id The President has the power to carry out the provi-
sions of the Act. Id- § 486(a).
In addition to considering the Procurement Act as sufficient statutory authority for
Executive Order 11,246, the Fourth Circuit in Liberty Mutual considered Titles VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1976), and the rejection of amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 as possible statutory authority for application of the Order to Liberty. 639 F.2d
at 172. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
Presidential action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is subject to congressional
approval. Id. Executive Order 11,246 has no similar provision for congressional review of
presidential action. Exec. Order 11,246, supra note 2. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the
Supreme Court concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not offer
statutory authority for Executive Order 11,246 because Title VI placed a congressional
check on presidential power and Executive Order 11,246 did not. 441 U.S. at 305-06 n.35; see
notes 2 & 4 supra. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory hiring
practices and discriminatory work practices by public employers, labor organizations, or
private businesses having fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) & (b) (1976). Title
VH does not require an employer to initiate affirmative action hiring practices. Id. §
2000e-2(j). Executive Order 11,246 requires the contractor to take affirmative action to
employ minorities. Exec. Order 11,246, supra note 2. The Fourth Circuit in Liberty Mutual
correctly held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not provide statutory
authority for Executive Order 11,246 because the Order requires affirmative action and Ti-
tle VII does not. See 639 F.2d at 172; notes 2 & 4 supra. As the Fourth Circuit noted, the
real issue is whether Title VII is the exclusive federal remedy in the employment
discrimination area and thus pre-empts Executive Order 11,246. See 639 F.2d at 172. Courts
do not view Title VII as the exclusive federal remedy in the employment discrimination
area. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) (Title VII sup-
ports existing employment discrimination laws); United States v. New Orleans Public Serv.,
Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977) (Title VII not exclusive federal remedy for employment
discrimination); United States v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507, 509 n.3 (W.D. Pa.
1976) (Title VII not exclusive remedy for employment discrimination).
Another source of congressional authority that the Fourth Circuit considered for ap-
plication of the Order to Liberty was the ratification of the Executive Order Program in the
debates surrounding adoption of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. See 639
F.2d at 172. Congress rejected amendments which would have made the Civil Rights Act of
1964 the exclusive federal remedy in the employment discrimination area and would have
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whether a sufficient nexus existed between the economy and efficiency
goals of the Procurement Act and the non-discrimination objectives of
the Executive Order.2 The Liberty Mutual court also inquired whether
application of the Order to Liberty would promote the economy and effi-
ciency purposes of the Procurement Act.' The Fourth Circuit held that
the Procurement Act did not provide adequate statutory authority for
application of the Order to Liberty."
The Fourth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's decision in Contrac-
tors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor" to
determine whether a sufficient nexus existed between the goals of the
Procurement Act and the application of the Order to Liberty.2 In Con-
tractors Association, the Assistant Secretary of Labor required bidders
on federally assisted government construction projects to submit affir-
mative action plans with their bids in accordance with Executive Order
11,246.1 Before issuance of the Order, factual findings indicated that
labor unions had used discriminatory hiring practices against Blacks. 4
The Order required bidders to commit themselves to specific goals for
minority hiring. Following issuance of the Order, the contractors in-
volved in the project sought injunctive relief against inclusion of the af-
firmative action requirements in their bids. The Third Circuit held that
transferred enforcement of Executive Order 11,246 to the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission. H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS'2137, 2176-77 (1972). Some courts have argued that the rejection of the propos-
ed amendments to the Equal Opportunity Employment Act demonstrated congressional en-
dorsement of the Executive Order Program. See Legal Aid Society v. Brennan, 608 F.2d
1319, 1329-30 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979) (Congress' rejection of attack on Executive Order Program
constituted ratification of Program); United States v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 553
F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977) (Congress has given longstanding recognition to Executive
Order 11,246). The Liberty Mutual court fouoid no negative ratification of Executive Order
11,246 in order to extend the Program to Liberty. 639 F.2d at 172. The Supreme Court
disfavors negative ratification theories. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 n.21 (1969)
(legislative silence poor way to determine legislative purpose); United States v. Price, 361
U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960) (congressional non-action is dubious foundation for drawing positive
inferences).
639 F.2d at 169-71. The House Report concerning the Procurement Act noted the
need for an improved and efficient federal property management program. H.R. Rep. No.
670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1949), reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1475,
1476 (1949). The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(the Hoover Commission) reported that the government needed centralization of records,
management, and maintenance of public buildings. H.R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
207 (1949), reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1475, 1476 (1949).
639 F.2d at 169.
N Id.
s, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
2 639 F.2d at 170.
s 442 F.2d at 163.
Id.
I Id. at 165.
1982]
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contractors' bids must include the affirmative action provisions." The
Third Circuit limited the holding in Contractors Association by noting
that all federal procurement contracts must include the affirmative ac-
tion provision, while the coverage on federally assisted contracts ex-
tends only to construction contracts." The Contractors Association court
noted that the President was not attempting to use the Order to impose
his notions of desirable social legislation on the states wholesale? 9
Rather, the Third Circuit concluded that the President acted in an area
where racial discrimination would affect government contract costs. 0
The court noted that the federal government had a vital interest in
assuring selection of workers from the largest labor pool to minimize
federal contract costs. 1
In Liberty Mutual, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Liberty, in con-
trast to the labor union in Contractors Association, did not have a direct
connection to federal procurement since Liberty was a subcontractor
and not a contractor.4 2 In the absence of findings indicating the percen-
tage of government costs attributable to workmen's compensation in-
surance, the Liberty Mutual court could not determine whether applica-
tion of the Order to Liberty would promote the government efficiency in
contract procurement that the Contractors Association court found.
3
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit noted the lack of evidence that insurers
practiced the deliberate discrimination that the labor unions in Contrac-
tors Association had practiced.44 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
no sufficient factual nexus existed between application of the Order and
promotion of government economy and efficiency that could justify ap-
plication of the Order to Liberty. 5
The Fourth Circuit refused to accept the proposition that equal
employment opportunities alone enabled the government to rely upon
the Procurement Act to justify application of the Order to Liberty.46 The





4' 639 F.2d at 171.
43 Id-
41 Id. at 170.
4' Id. at 171.
" Id. The Fourth Circuit in Liberty Mutual rejected the notion that broad social and
economic objectives enable the government to use the Procurement Act to justify applica-
tion of Executive Order 11,246. Id. Other courts, however, have permitted broad social and
economic goals to justify application of the Order. See Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan,
508 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.18 (7th Cir. 1974) (government procurement policies expanded to in-
clude social and economic objectives only indirectly related to conventional procurement
considerations); Northeast Constr. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (social
and economic objectives sufficient to validate use of the Procurement Act for application of
Executive Order 11,246).
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Liberty Mutual court held that application of the Order solely to pro-
mote national or social policies would violate the separation of powers
doctrine.4 7 The court rejected the proposition that the President could
apply the Order through inherent presidential powers,48 and noted that
the application of the Order must be pursuant to legislative authority.49
The Fourth Circuit held that a nexus between the goals of the Procure-
ment Act and the application of the Order constituted the only possible
basis of authorization for the Order.50
In Liberty Mutual, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that Liberty
was a subcontractor subject to the regulations of Executive Order
11,246.1' Under the regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order
11,246, "subcontractor" includes any service necessary to the perform-
ance of the contract.52 Insurance is a service under the regulations,53 and
state law requires workmen's compensation insurance.' Thus, the in-
surance Liberty provided was a necessary service.5 Since a reviewing
court must grant deference to an administrative agency's interpretation
of its own regulations,56 the Fourth Circuit correctly sustained Liberty's
classification as a subcontractor.
47 639 F.2d at 171. The Liberty Mutual court found a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine in applying the Order to Liberty because application of the Order to a
workmen's compensation insurance company was not within the contemplation of the Pro-
curement Act. Id. See note 28 supra. Since no statutory authority existed for application of
the Order to Liberty, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the President would violate the
separation of powers doctrine if the President legislated without authority. 639 F.2d at 171;
see note 3 supra.
,1 639 F.2d at 172 n.13. The Liberty Mutual dissent argued that the President had
authority to apply the affirmative action provisions of the Order to Liberty. Id. at 173.
Dissenting Judge Butzner asserted that the fifth amendment to the Constitution mandated
that the President prevent employment discrimination, and noted that the Procurement
Act granted the President authority to enforce the constitutional mandate. Id. Judge Butz-
ner stated that Executive Order 11,246 provided a means of achieving both the constitu-
tional and statutory objective. Id.
" Id at 172 n.13; see note 3 supra.
639 F.2d at 171. The Liberty Mutual court noted that cases upholding broad social
procurement authority under the Procurement Act might satisfy the factual nexus test
because those cases involved contractors and not a subcontractor. Id. at 171 & n.11; see note
46 supra. The factual nexus test requires a nexus between government economy and effi-
ciency and application of Executive Order 11,246. See text accompanying note 32 supra. The
Liberty Mutual court concluded that an increased labor pool could lower a contractor's costs
but not the costs of an insurer subcontractor. 639 F.2d at 171 n.11.
11 639 F.2d at 167.
'2 41 C.F.R. 60-1.3 (1980); see note 20 supra.
See note 20 supra.
See note 23 supra.
41 C.F.R. 60-1.3 (1980); see note 20 supra.
See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1969) (reviewing
court grants deference to administrative agency's interpretation of own regulation);
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946) (agency inter-
pretation of own regulation need not be only reasonable interpretation to be sustained on.
review).
1982]
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Although the Fourth Circuit correctly classified Liberty as a subcon-
tractor, the Liberty Mutual court misapplied the Contractors Associa-
tion factual nexus test.57 The Liberty Mutual court required a showing of
prior discrimination by insurers to authorize application of the Order to
Liberty since the court in Contractors Association noted the findings of
prior discrimination by the labor unions in upholding the Order. Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246 does not require previous discrimination,59
however, and previous discrimination by the labor unions was not deter-
minative in Contractors Association." In Contractors Association, the
Third Circuit conceded the irrelevance of previous discrimination by the
labor unions in determining the validity of the Order."' Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit declined to apply Executive Order 11,246 to Liberty ab-
sent evidence of the percentage of government costs attributable to
workmen's compensation insurers.2 In Contractors Association, the
court did not mention findings regarding costs attributable to workers
of the labor unions." In addition, the Contractors Association court's
analysis did not demonstrate that the Order would save costs in contract
procurement. 4 The Third Circuit merely assumed that the increased
labor pool resulting from application of the Order would lower govern-
ment construction costs.65 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's application of the
Contractors Association court's analysis places an unrealistic burden on
the government to apply Executive Order 11,246 because the govern-
ment must demonstrate past discrimination and future cost savings.66
Moreover, the Liberty Mutual holding will create difficulty for future
courts in determining when to apply Executive Order 11,246 because the
Liberty Mutual court did not state the extent of discrimination and cost
savings necessary to apply the Order.
Although the Liberty Mutual court misapplied the factual nexus test
of Contractors Association," the Fourth Circuit correctly stated that a
nexus must exist between the goals of the Procurement Act and applica-
tion of Executive Order 11,246 to a government subcontractor. 9 Broad
social and economic goals alone do not justify application of the Order
through the Procurement Act.7" Congress passed the Procurement Act
See 639 F.2d at 170.
Id.; see 442 F.2d at 175-77.
5' See Exec. Order 11,246, supra note 2.
442 F.2d at 175.
" Id
639 F.2d at 171.
442 F.2d at 175.
6Id.
65Id-
639 F.2d at 171.
67 Id.
See text accompanying notes 57-67 supra.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
7 See note 46 supra.
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to promote government economy and efficiency, rather than to further
broad social and economic goals.71 The Supreme Court has stated,
however, that government economy and efficiency are promoted if appli-
cation of the Order is reasonably related to promotion of government
economy and efficiency. 2 The Liberty Mutual court's requirement of fac-
tual findings of past discrimination and future government cost savings
goes beyond the Supreme Court's requirement that a reviewing court
find that the regulations are reasonably related to the enacting legisla-
tion. 3 The Liberty Mutual court's application of the nexus standard,
therefore, severely restricts the* government's freedom to apply Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246.
JOHN PALMER FISHWICK JR.
B. Allocation of Burdens of Proof and Persuasion
in Disparate Treatment Cases of Title VII Litigation
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII) prohibits employ-
ment discrimination by publie2 and private3 employers on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.' A person adversely affected
by an alleged unlawful employment practice may sue for relief under
either of two theories of Title VII discrimination, the disparate impact or
the disparate treatment theory.' The disparate impact theory proscribes
1 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
,1 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
'I&i § 2000e(h). Title VII applies to public employers including persons engaged in
running any activity, business or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would
hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce. Id-
3Id § 2000e(b). Title VII applies to private employers including persons who have fif-
teen or more employees engaged in an industry affecting commerce. Id
' Congress enacted Title VII to remove artificial and arbitrary barriers that restrict
equal employment opportunities. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). In
addition to prohibiting employment discrimination against minority groups, Title VII
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to aid in the ad-
ministration of provisions of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1976).
" An aggrieved plaintiff may sue under Title VII on the disparate impact or disparate
treatment theories of discrimination. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977). To take advantage of either of these theories of discrimination protection, a claimant
must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
employment act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 798 (1973). The claimant's right to sue under Title VII arises only after the EEOC
has issued a notice of the right to sue. Local 179, United Textile Workers v. Federal Paper
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employment practices that are facially neutral but discriminatory in
operation.' Plaintiffs in disparate impact cases need prove only that
challenged employment practices disproportionately harm a protected
minority group.' The disparate treatment theory, however, protects in-
dividuals from overtly discriminatory employment policies.8 Plaintiffs in
disparate treatment actions must show that an employer's actions
toward the employee were motivated by discrimination.9 The issue of
the employer's intent distinguishes disparate impact from disparate
treatment cases. Aggrieved employees must prove an employer's intent
to discriminate in disparate treatment actions.' ° In disparate impact ac-
tions, discriminatory intent is irrelevant."
While employee-plaintiffs bring disparate treatment claims more
Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 850 (8th Cir. 1972). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe
that discrimination is present in the challenged act, the EEOC will attempt to stop the
unlawful practice through informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id.
If the EEOC has not reached a conciliation agreement with the employer within 180 days of
the filing of the charge, or has not filed a civil suit based on the charge within the same time
limit, or has dismissed the claim, the EEOC must issue a notice to the claimant of the right
to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). After receiving notice of the right to sue, the
employee has ninety days in which to bring suit on his own behalf in federal district court.
Id.
For a discussion of the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories under which
a claimant may invoke Title VII protections, see Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs. 469 F. Supp. 329, 398-99 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd per curiam, 648 F.2d 922 (3d
Cir. 1981). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-12,
14-17, 73-75 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
' The Supreme Court formulated the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Plaintiffs in disparate impact cases must show that the
effects of employment practices, however unobjectionable in form, disproportionately harm
protected minority groups. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Protected minority groups under
Title VII include ethnic, racial and religious minorities and women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1976). Proof of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer is irrelevant in disparate
impact cases. See 401 U.S. at 432. But cf. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 259 (1977) (discriminatory intent in zoning decisions may be inferred
from overwhelming showing of disparate impact). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see note 6 supra.
The Supreme Court formulated the disparate treatment theory in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). When an employer denied an employee
reemployment because of his race, the Court sought to prohibit the employer's action on the
grounds of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII. Id. at 795-98. Plaintiffs in disparate
treatment cases must show that discriminatory intent on the part of the employer has af-
fected their individual status as employees adversely. Id. at 805-06. Unlike the disparate im-
pact theory, the disparate treatment theory requires that a plaintiff prove an employer's
discriminatory motive. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1978) (per
curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1144.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see note 8 supra.
" Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
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frequently than disparate impact claims under Title VII,"1 application of
Title VII protections has proven especially troublesome in disparate
treatment actions."3 Direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory
motive is difficult for plaintiffs to produce.'4 Additionally, courts have
had to reconcile the congressional policy of elimination of employment
discrimination with fair allocation of the evidentiary burdens of the par-
ties in cases involving disparate treatment." The United States Supreme
Court and the circuit courts have had difficulty in achieving consistent
application of the burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases. 6 In
" See Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Friedman].
" See Friedman, supra note 12, at 3-11.
" Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 398-99 (D. Or. 1970), affd, 492 F.2d
292 (9th Cir. 1974). A disparate treatment plaintiff may prove an employer's discriminatory
motive through the use of circumstantial evidence. 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION § 50.10 (1981). The use of circumstantial evidence to prove motive is particularly impor-
tant at the pretext stage of disparate treatment analysis. See note 42 infra. Oftentimes, a
plaintiff may not have equal access to the evidence pertaining to the defendant's articulated
reasons for the challenged employment decision. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555
F.2d 1251, 1255 (1977) (discussing advantages to plaintiff if defendant required to prove non-
discriminatory motive by preponderance of evidence). Thus, the plaintiff is at a disadvan-
tage in trying to gather direct evidence regarding an employer's motive. Allowing the plain-
tiff to produce circumstantial evidence, such as comparative statistical data and records of
hiring and discharge procedures, alleviates the plaintiff's disadvantage in proving
discriminatory intent. See Mayor of Phila. v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620
(1974) (statistical analyses serve important role as indicator of discrimination in Title VII
suits); text accompanying notes 90-97 infra.
" See generally Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Im-
plications of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 6-7, 59-61 (1976) (discussing implications of
order and allocation of proof in discrimination litigation for elimination of discriminatory
practices); Fourth Circuit Review-Substantive, Procedural and Remedial Issues in Title
VIl Litigation, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 604, 614 (1980).
16 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 4-11. The Supreme Court's reluctance to define
clearly the burdens of proof in disparate treatment actions resulted in a split in the lower
courts. Application of the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment formula among the cii-
cuits has been far from uniform. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 n.14 (3d Cir.
1977) (noting split in circuit court interpretation of McDonnell Douglas), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 913 (1978). The Supreme Court's use of imprecise terms such as "articulate" and
.prove" in its leading opinions on disparate treatment actions failed to clarify the burden of
proof issue. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24-25 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The majority of circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, have held that
a defendant-employer need only articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for an employment
decision to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. See, e.g., Powell v. Syracuse Univ.,
580 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp. 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977); Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409,
411 (8th Cir. 1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975); Gates v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 296 (9th Cir. 1974). Other courts, however, have concluded that
once a disparate treatment plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of persua-
sion shifts to the defendant. See, e.g., Turner v. Texas Instrumenis, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251,
1255 (5th Cir..1977); Ostapowica v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
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Page v Bolger,17 the Fourth Circuit recently reviewed the standards of
proof applicable under a disparate treatment claim of racial discrimina-
tion in promotion procedures.
Carl F. Page was a black employee of the United States Postal Ser-
vice.18 In January 1976, Page sought promotion to a supervisory position
within the Richmond Post Office.19 The district manager of the post of-
fice appointed a review committee of three white males to screen the ap-
plicants for the position. 0 The committee recommended three appli-
cants, including Page, for the job.21 The postmaster of the Richmond Post
Office (postmaster) promoted the top-ranked candidate, a white male, to
the position.' Later, in August 1976, Page sought promotion to a dif-
ferent supervisory position.' A new review committee, formed in com-
pliance with postal service personnel guidelines, convened to screen the
applicants.24 A committee found that Page was qualified for the position,
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Randolph v. United States Elevator Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1120,
1126 (S.D. Fla. 1978). The defendant then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
legitimate reasons for the challenged employment decision. See Cross v. United States
Postal Service, 639 F.2d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1981) (defendant bears burden of showing by
preponderance of evidence that legitimate factual reasons for employment decisions exist);
accord, Loeb v. Textron, Inc. 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court's
most recent opinion on the burden of proof issue is Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, the Supreme Court states that the defen-
dant's burden in disparate treatment actions is one of production, not persuasion. Id. at
252-53. The Burdine opinion reaffirms the holdings of the majority of circuits on the burden
of proof issue and should settle the controversy between circuits on the evidentiary burden
issue. See text accompanying notes 56-73 infra.
645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3269 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981).
is Id. at 228.
19 Id. Page sought promotion from mail foreman to general foreman of the mails, an ex-
ecutive postal service job designated at postal executive salary level 17 (PES-17). Id.
Id. at 229. The appointment of three white males to the review committee responsi-
ble for screening the candidates for promotion violated internal fair hiring guidelines of the
Postal Service. See id. at 228. The internal guidelines govern all promotions and
reassignments within the United States Postal Service. Id. at 235 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
The guidelines are an effort by the Postal Service to comply with the Congressional man-
date embodied in §§ 720.201 to 720.207 of Volume 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations pro-
moting affirmative action policies within the federal government. 5 C.F.R. §§
720.201-720.207 (1978). Section 544.2 of the Postal Service's Personnel Handbook provides,
in pertinent part, that a postal official shall appoint a review committee responsible for
screening and recommending applicants interested in promotion to vacant positions. 645
F.2d at 228. The guidelines state that the appointing official should make "every effort to
select at least one woman and/or minority group member" for the review committee.
POSTAL SERVICE, PERSONNEL HANDBOOK P-11, C(4), § 544.2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PER-
SONNEL HANDBOOK].
2' 645 F.2d at 229.
2I21
I Id. Page sought a second promotion to the position of postal operations specialist,
designated at postal executive salary level 18 (PES-18). Id.
2' Id. The district manager appointed a black postal employee to serve on the second
review committee. Id The black representative, however, could not serve on the committee
because of an appointment to a new assignment in Philadelphia. Id. Consequently, three
white males also composed the second review committee. Id.
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but recommended two white male applicants as better qualified.' The
postmaster did not promote Page and chose the top-ranked white appli-
cant for the position.28 Page subsequently filed a racial discrimination
suit against the Postmaster General of the United States (Postmaster
General)" under section 7171 of Title VII. Page argued that the
repeated refusals to promote him constituted discrimination under the
disparate treatment theory." -
Following a plenary trial, the district court dismissed Page's action
on the merits. 1 Page appealed the dismissal to the Fourth Circuit.32 The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded with
directions to award Page compensatory and injunctive relief., The
Postmaster General petitioned the Fourth Circuit for a rehearing. On
rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant's
reasons for not promoting Page were legitimate and not merely a pre-
text for actual discriminatory motives, thereby rebutting Page's prima
facie showing of disparate treatment. The circuit court affirmed the
district court's ruling and dismissed Page's claim.
The Fourth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's, opinion in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greenl to reject Page's disparate treat-
25Id.
26Id.
" Page filed suit against William F. Bolger, the Postmaster General of the United
States (Postmaster General). Id. at 228. As the head of the agency, Bolger is the statutory
defendant in a Title VII action against the Postal Service. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976); see
Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Page brought suit under section 717(c) of Title VII. 645 F.2d at 228. Section 717(c) ap-
plies the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII to the Postal Service and other federal
agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). In pertinent part, § 717 provides "All personnel ac-
tions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in the United States Postal Ser-
vice and the Postal Rate Commission ... shall be made free from any discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex,-or national origin:' Id. Prior to bringing suit, Page had filed two
complaints with the EEOC contesting the postal promotion procedures. 645 F.2d at 229. The
EEOC, however, decided both claims against Page. Id. at 229 n.6. Section 717 of Title VII
permits federal agency employees to bring suit on allegations of employment discrimination
following exhaustion of administrative procedures. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
645 F.2d at 228; see also notes 1-8 supra.
Id. at 231; see note 8 supra.
SI Id at 228. The district court held that Page failed to establish a claim of discrimina-
tion under the disparate treatment theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). 645 F.2d at 228; see note 7 supra; text accompanying notes 35-60 infra.
= 645 F.2d at 228.
3 Id. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the postmaster's use of all-white
review committees constituted discrimination violating § 717 of Title Vu. Page v. Bolger,
No. 78-1792 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 1979).
3' 645 F.2d at 228.
Id. at 234; see text accompanying notes 39-55 infra.
" 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see note 8 supra. While McDonnell Douglas is the leading case
on standards of proof in disparate treatment actions, some commentators have criticized the
lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's opinion. See, e.g., Mendez, Presumptions of Dis-
criminatory Motive in Title VIIDisparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1130-33
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ment claim." In applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Fourth
Circuit found that Page satisfied his initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment." The court also concluded that
the defendant carried the burden of production necessary to rebut the
inference of discriminatory intent.40 Page then attempted to establish
that the defendant's stated reasons for non-promotion were merely a
pretext covering up a racially motivated decision.41 Page claimed that
the all-white review committees were the source of discrimination
against him.42 Page alleged that due to the racial imbalance of the review
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Mendez]; Friedman, supra note 12, at 2-3. The Supreme Court
has attempted to resolve the ambiguities of McDonnell Douglas in later cases. See Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (employer does not have
burden of proving absence of discriminatory intent); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.,S. 567, 574 (1978) (employer must prove that employment decision based on legitimate
consideration).
645 F.2d at 229-34.
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by satisfying four requirements. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). The plaintiff must show that he was a member of a racial minority, that he
sought and was qualified for a position for which the employer was taking applications, that
the employer rejected him despite his qualifications, and that after the employer rejected
him, the position remained available to others with similar qualifications. Id.; see SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1155 (plaintiff has fairly easy burden of establishing prima facie
case in disparate treatment cases).
40 645 F.2d at 230. The members of the promotion review committees testified that
they found Page to be subjectively and objectively less qualified than the other candidates
for the jobs. Id. The EEOC appeals examiner who conducted the initial administrative hear-
ings on Page's complaint concluded from the record of the committee selection procedures
that the postmaster's articulated reason of better qualifications of others was consistent
with the objective indicators of Page's performance in relation to other applicants. Id. at 230
n.8. The postmaster's practice was to select the most qualified candidate to fill vacant posi-
tions. Id. at 229. n.5.
The Fourth Circuit views the defendant's rebuttal burden as one of production and not
persuasion, thus the Postmaster General's reasons satisfied the court that no discrimina-
tory motive existed. Id. at 230. See Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv. 609 F.2d
702, 714 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant's burden in disparate treatment action one of production
not persuasion); Fourth Circuit Review-Standards of Proof in Title VII Litigation, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 645, 650 (1981).
41 645 F.2d at 231. The defendant's rebuttal may neutralize the plaintiffs prima facie
case in disparate treatment actions. See id. at 230. Therefore, the pretext stage of proof
becomes the most important stage of analysis. Smith v. University of N.C., 18 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 913, 916 (M.D.N.C. 1978). See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
578 (1978); text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
42 645 F.2d at 231. Page attempted to substantially alter the focus of the suit by alleg-
ing that the source of the discrimination was the formation of the review committee. Id. at
232. The thrust of Page's argument was that the postal authorities' failure to appoint a
member of a minority group to the review committees was the result of discriminatory
motives. Id. In essence, Page argued that but for the absence of a minrority member on the
review committee, the postmaster would have promoted him.
Page's argument contained several logical fallacies. First, Page challenged only the
racial imbalance of the committees. Id. The appointment of a woman to the committees,
however, would have satisfied the postal guidelines concerning committee composition. PER-
[Vol. XXXIX
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
committees responsible for promotion recommendations, the postmaster
repeatedly denied him promotion."3 Accordingly, Page urged the Fourth
Circuit to redirect its analysis under McDonnell Douglas." Page re-
quested that the court explore the reasons behind the personnel actions
that led to racial imbalance on the review committees and not merely
focus on the asserted reasons underlying the postmaster's ultimate pro-
motion decisions. 5
The Fourth Circuit rejected Page's proposed modification of McDon-
nell Douglas.48 The court maintained that the proper focus in all
disparate treatment actions is whether discrimination occurred in
ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, discharging, or promoting
employees. Section 717 of Title VII under which Page brought his claim
is aimed at the abolition of discrimination in personnel actions affecting
federal employees. 48 The Fourth Circuit construed the term "personnel
SONNEL HANDBOOK, supra note 20, § 544.2. For Page to assert that the absence of a black on
the committees constituted discrimination against him in particular was to ask for special
treatment, which is not consistent with Title VII. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII
Reconsidered. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1972). Second, Page asserted that the racial imbalance of the committees should result auto-
matically in a ruling of discrimination. Brief for Appellee at 19, Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227
(4th Cir. 1981). No law, however, requires that postal review be balanced racially. 645 F.2d
at 231. Cf. Frink v. United States Navy, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases, 67, 70-71 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(use of all white supervisors to supervise black employees not racial discrimination). If Page
wanted to prove that use of all-white postal review committees unfairly discriminated
against blacks, the best recourse would have been to bring a disparate impact action. In a
disparate impact action, if Page had proved that all-white review committees dispropor-
tionately harmed minority promotion in the post office, then he would have substantiated
his claim that the committees were the source of discrimination in his case. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also note 6 supra. Third, Page contended that
a violation of the postal guidelines constituted a direct violation of Title VII provisions, a
proposition that the Fourth Circuit was unwilling to accept because the guidelines were not
mandatory affirmative action regulations and, thus, did not have the force of law. 645 F.2d
at 232 n.10. Last, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the postal authorities made "every
effort" to satisfy that the postal authorities made "every effort" to satisfy the review com-
mittee guidelines. Id. at 231. Therefore, the court recognized no violation of the guidelines.
Id.
,s 645 F.2d at 232.
Id. Page brought suit under § 717 of Title VII, which applies specifically to
discrimination in personnel actions of federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976); see note
28 supra. Thus, Page asked that the court refocus its analysis under McDonnell Douglas to
concentrate on the mid-level personnel actions of the Post Office. 645 F.2d at 232. Page's
proposed analysis would shift the focus of the defendant's burden of proof from why the
postmaster did not promote Page to why the postal review committees contained no minority
members.
'5 645 F.2d at 232.
45Id
11 Id. at 233; see, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 29 (1978) (per curiam)
(failure to promote); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 409-11, 439 (1975) (failure
to hire); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 334 (5th Cir. 1977) (failure
to transfer) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). The basic purpose of § 717 is to eliminate every vestige
of employment discrimination within the federal government. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520
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actions" in the language of section 717 to mean the final decisions of
federal agencies as employers." The court refused to extend the antidis-
crimination provisions of section 717 to personnel actions that have no
immediate effect on final employment decisions. 0 The Page majority
adopted the standard disparate treatment approach of McDonnell
Douglas to find that section 717 did not govern the actions concerning
constitution of the postal review committees."1
Examining the specific facts in Page, the Fourth Circuit determined
that the personnel actions in question were the refusals to promote
Page." The court noted that the Postmaster General's burden of proof
was only one of production concerning the final decisions not to promote
Page. 3 Since the defendant offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the decision not to promote Page, the Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed that the reason stated was not a pretextual cover for discriminatory
motives. 4 The court held that Page had failed to establish his discrimina-
tion claim and affirmed the district court's dismissal on the merits."
The Fourth Circuit's approach in Page is consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.8 In Burdine, the Court addressed the issue of the
defendant's evidentiary burden in disparate treatment actions. 7 The
Court quickly disposed of the issue of whether a community labor
bureau sufficiently rebutted a prima facie case of discrimination through
testimony that the challenged employment decisions were based on
reasons other than gender. 8 The Burdine Court stated that the defen-
F.2d 108, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also SUBCOMM. ON LABOR ON THE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF
1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1972) (compendium of bills, committee reports, and congres-
sional debate that resulted in passage of Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972).
In Page, the Fourth Circuit stated that § 717 coverage refers to personnel actions in
terms of ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, promoting, and com-
pensating. 645 F.2d at 233. Pragmatism supports attempts to identify the standard of what
is and what is not a personnel action subject to coverage of Title VII. Difficulties arise,
however, in trying to separate intermediate steps in the employment process from a final
decision. Id. The Fourth Circuit recognized the problem and stated that the holding in Page
is not a general test for defining which employment decisions § 717 covers. Id
49 Id.
' Id.; see text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
", 645 F.2d at 233.
52 1&.
I Id. at 230; accord, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981) (in disparate treatment action plaintiff bears burden of persuasion, defendant bears
burden of production).
645 F.2d at 230.
Id. at 234.
5' 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
, Id. at 250.
In Burdine, a female employee of the Texas Department of Community Affairs
(TDCA) challenged employment decisions failing to promote her and subsequently ter-
minating her as sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. at 250-52. The main issue in
the case was whether, after a plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of disparate treatment,
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dant's burden in disparate treatment cases is one of production. 9 ATitle
VII defendant need not ultimately persuade the court that the employ-
ment action in question was lawful but need only produce evidence that
the action was the result of nondiscriminatory reasons.0 The Court
noted, however, that a defendant may not rebut a presumption of discri-
mination merely by pleading that his action were legitimate, but must
present admissable evidence that would allow the court rationally to
conclude that his actions were lawful.
6 1
The Postmaster General's burden of proof in Page was similar to
that of the labor bureau in Burdine.2 The employers in both Page and
Burdine refused to promote their respective employees.63 The employers
in both cases offered the better relative qualifications of other appli-
cants to justify the promotion decisions. 4 The Page and Burdine courts
were satisfied, however, with the defendant's proferred justifications
despite the absence of a preponderance of the evidence proving these
reasons." The Fourth Circuit held that the Postmaster General ade-
quately dispelled the prima facie inference of discrimination by articulat-
ing legitimate reasons for the decisions not to promote Page. The
Fourth Circuit's holding that the defendant's evidentiary burden in
disparate treatment actions is one of production and not persuasion is
proper in that it is consistent with Burdine.
The dissent in Page' argued that Burdine requires highly specific
proof from a defendant to rebut the alleged discriminatory 'actions. 7 The
dissent maintained that the Postmaster General's reliance upon the
the burden that shifts to the defendant is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
legitimate reasons for the employment decisions existed. Id. at 250. The Fifth Circuit
upheld the defendant's burden as one of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 252; see Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 565-67 (5th Cir.
1979). On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, holding
that the defendant bears only the burden of production in rebutting a prima facie case of
disparate treatment. Id. at 260. The TDCA offered the legitimate reasons of better
qualifications of other workers and inability to get along with other employees to justify
Burdine's non-promotion and discharge. Id. at 251, 257 n.11.
SId. at 260.
e6 Id
" Id. at 255 n.9. In an effort to clarify the requirements of the defendant's burden of
production in disparate treatment actions, the Supreme Court distinguished mere pleading
from the presentation of admissible evidence. Id The Burdine Court reasoned that requir-
ing the defendant to provide specific evidence aids the plaintiff in demonstrating intentional
discrimination far better than a burden of production satisfied by mere articulation or
pleading would. Id. at 255-56; see note 88 infra.
Compare Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 with
Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d at 230 (defendants bear burden of production on issue of non-
promotion in disparate treatment actions).
" See 450 U.S. at 250; 645 F.2d at 229.
" See 450 U.S. at 251; 645 F.2d at 229.
' See 450 U.S. at 254-56; 645 F.2d at 230.
645 F.2d at 230-31.
Id at 238-39 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (employer required to articulate justification
for his actions that does not rest on tainted procedure).
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recommendations of the review committees as justification for the non-
promotion of Page did not rebut Page's prima facie case.68 The dissent
argued that because the review committees were formed in violation of
postal regulations the Postmaster General could not rely on their recom-
mendation to justify the promotion actions. 9 The Page dissent viewed
the defendant's burden as one of providing legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for the absence of a minority member on the review commit-
tees.°
The Supreme Court consistently has held that defendants in dis-
parate treatment actions bear a burden of production to rebut inferences
of discrimination. 1 The Supreme Court's interchangeable use of impre-
cise terms such as "articulate" and "prove" in its leading opinions on
standards of proof in disparate treatment actions, however, has given
rise to uncertainty among the circuits in applying these standards. 2 Con-
sequently, Burdine is an attempt by the Supreme Court to reiterate and
clarify its previous holdings limiting the defendant's burden to one of
Id. at 238. The Page dissent relied on Burdine in determining what the defendant's
burden of proof should be in disparate treatment actions. Id
The dissent quoted a portion of Burdine that it thought to be controlling concerning
the defendant's burden of proof. Id. The quoted passage states that the defendant satisfies
his burden of proof if he clearly sets forth the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection, which
raises a genuine issue of fact whether the defendant did in fact discriminate. Id The
Postmaster General satisfied both of these requirements by offering the review committee
recommendations as the reason for the decisions not to promote Page. Id at 231.
Significantly, the dissent rejected the Postmaster General's evidence, although his evidence
satisfied the Burdine test the dissent cited as controling. Id. at 238.
" Id. The dissent characterized the Postmaster General's reliance on the recommenda-
tions of the postal review committees as, in effect, reliance on unlawful conduct. Id. The dis-
sent viewed the postal guidelines as having the force of law with regard to postal employ-
ment actions. Id at 236. The absence of a minority member on the postal review committees
in violation of the guidelines therefore constituted a violation of the law. Id Thus, the dis-
sent rejected the contention that the defendant could justify his decision not to promote
Page on the basis of a recommendation from an unlawful review committee. Id. at 238. The
Page majority accepted the proposition that the postal guidelines have the force of law. Id.
at 232 n.10; see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979) (recognizing federal
court's duty to enforce agency regulations). The majority made the distinction, however,
between vioaltion of agency regulations and violations of Title VII. 645 F.2d at 232 n.10. The
majority held that violations of agency regulations do not constitute violations of Title VII
and thus, cannot be redressed as Title VII violations. Id. For this reason, the majority was
willing to allow the Postmaster General to rely on the review committee recommendations
as rebuttal evidence to Page's Title VII claim even though the composition of the review
committees violated agency regulations. Id at 231-32.
'0 645 F.2d at 236.
"' See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). See generally Friedman, supra note 12, at 4.
2 See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 n.14 (3d Cir. 1977) (split in circuit court
interpretation of McDonnell Douglas). See generally Mendez, supra note 37, at 1135-39;
Friedman, supra note 12, at 2-11.
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production concerning the underlying reasons for an employment deci-
sion.,1
Fair allocation of the burdens of proof and production is critical to
the outcome of Title VII disputes.74 Prior to Burdine, circuit courts that
imposed the burden of persuasion on the defendant in disparate treat-
ment actions lessened the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
employer acted with discriminatory intent. 5 Arguably, imposition of
only the burden of production on Title VII plaintiffs fosters more
vigorous eradication of employment discrimination. Thus, the Fourth
Circuit's allocation of the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff, although
consistent with Burdine, appears facially inconsistent with Title VII's
goal of eliminating discrimination.77 In enacting Title VII, however, Con-
" See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 249-53, 256-60
(1981). (Supreme Court readdresses issue of defendant's evidentiary burden in employment
discrimination suits).
o 74 See Mendez, supra note 37, at 1130. Mendez recognizes that the allocation of the risk
of nonpersuasion in a disparate treatment action may be critical to the outcome of the case.
Id. For example, if the risk of nonpersuasion remains with the plaintiff, the defendafit
employer may be entitled to a directed verdict without having presented any evidence,, in
the event the plaintiff fails to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 1148-49..Con-
versely, if the risk of nonpersuasion remains with the defendant, the plaintiff may not have
to proceed to the pretext stage of the proof if the defendant fails to produce satisfactory
rebuttal evidence. rd. Mendez notes, then, that the crucial issue in McDonnell Douglas is
whether the court intended to place the risk of nonpersuasion on the plaintiff or defendant
in disparate treatment actions. Id. at 1149-50. Mendez argues that the Supreme Court in-
tended that the plaintiff retain the risk of nonpersuasion and the defendant retain the
burden of production. Id. at 1150. Mendez presents an interesting analysis of the effect that
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 would have on clarifying the evidentiary burdens of the par-
ties in disparate treatment actions. See id. at 1151; FED. R. EVID. 301.
" The rationale for requiring a defendant to prove nondiscriminatory motives by a
preponderance of the evidence in disparate treatment cases is that the plaintiff cannot be
expected to disprove a defendant's reasons unless the defendant has stated the reasons
with specificity. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d at 1003, 1011-12 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979). Cf. Alex-
ander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972) (defense of good faith concerning subjective
employer decisions not sufficient to rebut inference of discrimination in jury selection case).
7' Title VII legislation is remedial in nature. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) & (b) (1976). To en-
courage plaintiffs to bring discrimination suits that in effect broaden the court's opportunity
to abolish discrimination, the plaintiffs prima facie burden is not onerous. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
The Page majority refused to modify the McDonnell Douglas analysis by shifting
the defendant's burden of proof to the issue of the composition of the promotion review com-
mittees. 645 F.2d at 232-33. If the Fourth Circuit had shifted the defendant's burden, Page
might have been able to establish the postmaster's liability more easily. With an increased
burden of proof concerning review committee composition, the defendant would have had to
produce evidence concerning the particular procedures related to committee formation.
Plaintiff Page, therefore, would not have had to attempt to prove that the absence of a black
on the committees was due to discriminatory design as the pretext portion of his proof. If
Page did not have to proceed to the pretext stage of proof as he did in the original action,
his burden of proof on the issue of the postmaster's liability would be less complicated. Had
the Fourth Circuit decided to modify the defendant's burden of proof under McDonnell
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gress also was aware' of the need to avoid stringent proscription of
employer conduct 8 Congress carefully designed Title VII to avoid cur-
tailing traditional employer perogatives in the management of employ-
ees unless the decisions were discriminatory in nature.79
The Page court's standard of employer liability under section 717 of
Title VII provides for the protection of legitimate employer interests.
The Page majority refused to extend the liability of federal employers to
cover routine personnel actions that are only one component of ultimate
employment decisions." The Fourth Circuit limited the employer's
burden of production to the final employment decisions such as hiring,
promotion, and discharge for which the employer alone is responsible.8
Expansion of the employer's burden to include the reasons behind subor-
dinate personnel actions under section 717 would pose serious practical
problems. The sheer number of mid-level personnel actions that occur in
federal agencies would be difficult for the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission to police. Similarly, enforcement of all the increased
claims drastically would increase the workload of the courts. Finally, had
the Fourth Circuit in Page allowed Title VII protections to include com-
pliance with internal affirmative action guidelines like those of the Post
Office, the high standard of employer liability would discourage
employers' voluntary efforts to initiate antidiscrimination policies." In
light of these considerations, the Fourth Circuit in Page prudently
recognized the interests of employers under section 717 of Title VII.
The Page court also complied with the congressional intent to
equalize private sector rights and remedies with those of federal
employees under section 717 by refusing to increase a federal employer's
Douglas, the court would have eased the plaintiffs burden by eliminating the pretext stage
of the proof. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit's decision has overall positive ramifications.
Refusal to increase the defendant's burden of proof protects employer-defendants from ex-
cess time and expense associated with obtaining sufficient information to challenge a § 717
claim against them. Additionally, in cases similar to Page where increasing the defendant's
burden would eliminate a portion of the plaintiffs proof, refusal to increase the defendant's
burden guards employers from specious claims, and similarly prevents overburdening of
courts with § 717 suits. These protections enable courts to devote their time to hearing
substantial and serious Title VII actions, fostering vigorous elimination of patterns and
practices of discrimination in accordance with the legislative intent underlying Title VII.
See notes 4 & 76 supra.
78 Congress did not intend to eliminate employee qualification, skill, and merit as valid
reasons for differences in treatment by an employer. See S. REP. No. 91-1137, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey indicating that employers
free to choose employees on basis of qualifications).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(h) (1976) (not unlawful for employers to apply different
privileges of employment pursuant to bona fide seniority, merit, or production systems).
645 F.2d at 233.
81 Id
A2 Id. at 233-34; see Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 718
(4th Cir. 1979) (heavy burden on employers under Title VII will limit employer efforts to ad-
minister affirmative action programs).
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burden of proof in disparate treatment actions. 3 Prior to the enactment
of section 717, federal employees aggrieved by discriminatory employ-
ment practices could seek relief only through the administrative chan-
nels of the particular agency in which they worked.14 The basic purpose
of section 717 is to extend Title VII protections governing private sector
employees to public sector employees.15 By applying the tripartite
disparate treatment analysis of McDonnell Douglas to federal employee
actions, the Fourth Circuit equalized the evidentiary burdens of federal
and non-federal employees and employers. The dissent in Page sug-
gested that federal employers should be subject to a more stringent
burden of proof because they work in the higher levels of government
service.8 The Page majority rejected the imposition of a stringent
burden of proof and subjected federal employers to the same burden of
production as private sector employers. 7 By placing the same burden of
proof on federal and non-federal employers, the Fourth Circuit advanced
procedural equality under Title VII among all types and levels of work
forces consistent with the design of section 717.
Although the Fourth Circuit's decision in Page is sound in light of
Supreme Court precedent and the particular goals of section 717, the
Page decision ,failed to address some important aspects of section 717
disparate treatment litigation. The Fourth Circuit, by limiting the defen-
dant's.burden to production and not persuasion, ensured that section 717
did not become a device to stifle federal employer's perogatives in
' See note 28 supra.
" Title VII did not protect federal employees from discrimination until Congress
amended the Act in 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e(b) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979)). Although
federal employment discrimination violated the Constitution, before the 1972 amendments
judicial relief was uncertain. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (school desegrega-
tion case). Prior to 1972 each federal agency handled its own charges of discrimination.
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1969). Section 717 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 now proscribes federal employment discrimination and establishes an ad-
ministrative and judicial enforcement system. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
', Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
" See 645 F.2d at 238 (Butzner, J., dissenting). The Page dissent suggested that courts
should protect federal employees who work in the higher levels of government service by
imposing a strict standard of liability on federal employers. I& The dissent stated that the
Fourth Circuit should treat the violations of federal agency guidelines as violations of Title
VII in order to protect federal employees. Id.; see note 69 supra. The dissent's attempt to
equate violations of agency guidelines with Title VII violations necessarily imposes a higher
standard of liability on employers. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra. Since an
employer-defendant would be subject to liability for violations of agency guidelines, his
overall exposure for Title VII liability would be greatly increased under the dissent's
analysis. Employers would not only have to refrain from discriminatory employment prac-
tices under Title VII, but also would have to take positive action in hiring minorities to
satisfy agency guidelines. An employer's liability is increased then by having to satisfy two
sets of anti-discrimination regulations rather than Title VII alone.
I See 645 F.2d at 233. The majority rejected the dissent's suggestion of a more
onerous burden of proof for federal employers. See note 86 infra.
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management decisions. The court failed to consider, however, whether
its liberal application of section 717 protections diminished the value of
the section as a source of remedial redress for federal employees."9
Because the Fourth Circuit construed the term "personnel actions" as
the ultimate decisions of an employer, the question of whether a federal
employee who was discriminated against at the bottom or intermediate
levels of a decisionmaking hierarchy could demonstrate intentional
discrimination under the Page framework is doubtful."
In balancing the interests of employers and employees, the Page
court failed to weigh sufficiently the importance of Title VII as remedial
legislation. The court upheld the plaintiff's initial, easy burden of
establishing a prima facie case, which facilitates bringing a Title VII
claim.9" The Page court, however, imposed an equally light burden on the
defendant to rebut the prima facie inference of discrimination.91 When
the defendant need only articulate a legitimate reason on which he
The Supreme Court in Burdine addressed the question of whether the McDonnell
Douglas framework allows a plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimina-
tion. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981). The Court's
discussion of the issue, however, was largely cosmetic. The Court cited the defendant's in-
centive in presenting clear and factual evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination as
well as the plaintiff's access to the defendant's and the EEOC's evidence concerning the
issue of discrimination as factors that ease the plaintiffs burden in proving discriminatory
intent. Id- at 257-58. The Court underestimated, though, the ingenuity of the bad faith
defendant. Such a defendant, without presenting clear and factual evidence, is able to
escape Title VII liability since he sustains only a burden of production concerning a single
legitimate reason for an employment decision and thus may not be required to present the
actual reason behind his decision. Similarly, the Court disregarded the fact that many Title
VII plaintiffs, especially if they are out of work, may not have the financial leverage to
engage in liberal discovery using methods of statistical proof of comparative evaluation of
employer's hiring, discharge, and promotion processes. Another basic problem in Burdine
was the Court's assumption that some factual evidence exists by which a plaintiff meriting
relief will be able to prove discriminatory intent. This premise contains an inherent fallacy.
Intent as a form of subjective mens rea is rarely susceptible to factual proof. A plaintiff may
never be able to demonstrate this type of discriminatory intent no matter how much factual
evidence he or she has access to. While the Burdine Court discused the issue of remedial ef-
fectiveness that the Page court ignored, the Supreme Court's discussion is -nonetheless
superficial and unpersuasive.
" Page limits the thrust of a section 717 disparate treatment action to the ultimate
decisions of employers. 645 F.2d at 233. The Fourth Circuit left the question of how a
federal plaintiff pursues redress for discriminatory intermediate personnel actions
unanswered. Arguably, the Fourth Circuit in Page may be implying that plaintiffs should
challenge the intermediate level actions within agency channels. A return to intra-agency
remedies, such as administrative hearings, however, would force federal employees back to
the parochial position they were in prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII and would
negate the purpose of § 717. See note 84 supra.
' 645 F.2d at 229-30. The Page court limited the plaintiff's prima facie burden to the
simple standard of McDonnell Douglas. 645 F.2d at 233. The McDonnell Douglas burden of
establishing a prima facie case is a relatively easy one that promotes the remedial aspects of
Title VII. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 4 n.17; Comment, Applying the Title VIIPrima
Facie Case to Title VlI Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128, 163-177 (1976) (remedial
aspects of Title VII and allocation of evidentiary burdens in other contexts).
91 645 F.2d at 230.
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might have based his employment decision, that reason alone extin-
guishes the inference of discrimination and the plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion at the pretext stage of the proof.2 The Fourth Cir-
cuit did not address the issue of what problems the defendant's rebuttal
evidence presents for plaintiffs seeking to prove pretextual discrimina-
tion on the part of employers. The rebuttal evidence may suggest that
the employer's motives were legitimate, when in fact they were not.
This presumption of validity may force a plaintiff to prove that a reason
presumed true, but without factual foundation, was a pretext for
discrimination. 3 The task of proving pretext in this situation is for-
midable. 4 The defendant often has superior access to any evidence that
is relevant to the proof of pretext. 5 Additionally, plaintiffs similar to
Page are allowed to prove discrimination only in the final employment
decision. By limiting the applicability of section 717 to ultimate
management decisions, the Fourth Circuit effectively foreclosed federal
employees from raising evidence of arbitrary discrimination at lower
levels of the decision process, even in the pretext stage of proof.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Page is consistent with established
precedent that places the burden of production on defendants in dis-
parate treatment actions. The court considered the interests of employ-
ers and employees in applying the standard McDonnell Douglas
disparate treatment analysis to achieve administrative equality in sec-
tion 717 discrimination litigation. In accordance with the aim of section
717, Page equalized a federal employer's burden of proof with the
burden that private sector employers bear in Title VII actions. Page,
therefore, is a procedurally sound decision on the facts. Although the
Fourth Circuit carefully considered the procedural burden of proof issue
in Page, the court ignored the substantive questions concerning the
problems that the defendant's evidence presents for plaintiffs in
disparate treatment actions. Proper consideration of the inferences and
evidence that disparate treatment litigation raises it the only way to ef-
fectuate the statutory guarantees of Title VII.9 The Fourth Circuit's
failure to address these issues adequately in Page may have dealt a
severe blow to the potency of section 717 as a source of remedial relief
for federal employees.
PAMELA ANN HASENSTEIN
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
,3 Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977); accord Loeb v.
Textron, Inc. 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979).
Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc. 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977).
9 3 Id.
645 F.2d at 233.
' See note 89 supra.
" 645 F.2d at 233.
See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)
(noting that allocation of burdens and creation of presumptions intended to sharpen inquiry
into discrimination questions).
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C. Class Action Certification in Title VII Litigation
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 in an ef-
fort to achieve equality in employment opportunities by eliminating any
employment practice which discriminates against any individual on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.2 Title VII's prohibi-
tion of discriminatory business practices prevents not only overt
discrimination but also those facially neutral employment practices that
are discriminatory in operation.' Consequently, courts generally con-
strue Title VII liberally in an effort to give -effect to Congress' remedial
intent.4 Under Title VII, Congress created the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), which possesses central administrative
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 2000e-2 makes unlawful any ac-
tions by employers in refusing to hire or discharging any individual, or. otherwise
discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, or privileges of
employment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or otherwise discriminating against any
individual with respect to compensation, terms, or privileges of employment on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion or national origin. Id. Section 2000e-1 states that Title VIl's provi-
sions shall not apply to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to any individuals
performing work connected with religious corporations, associations, educational institu-
tions or societies. Id. at § 2000e-1 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See Fekete v. United States Steel
Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1970) (purpose of Title VII). See generally J. COOPER, DEFIN-
ING DISCRIMINATION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 75-76 (1976) (employment discrimination may exist as result of disadvantages
resulting either from past general practices of society or from past general practices of par-
ticular employer).
' See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (to establish prima facie case
of discrimination, plaintiff need only show that employer has used facially neutral standards
to select applicants for hire in significantly discriminatory pattern); General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976) (plaintiff can establish prima facie violation of Title VII
upon proof that effect of otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to discriminate
against members of one class or another); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1971) (employers cannot maintain practices neutral on their face if they operate to freeze
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices).
' See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) (courts must accord civil
rights legislation sweep as broad as statute's language); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1974) (courts have obligation to ensure that Title VII
works); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (courts, to avoid
hampering congressional intent, should give Title VII liberal construction); Jones, The
Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12 (1976) (Supreme Court clearly stated that remedial power under Title
VII is power to make injured party whole, that courts are to place injured party in approx-
imate position he would have occupied had his employer not committed the wrong); Miller,
Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 43 MISs. L.J. 275, 275-76 (1972) (liberal construction of Title VII by courts has short-
circuited system in which Congress envisioned conciliatory efforts between Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and employers as primary enforcement device, and
courts consequently have become champions of aggrieved).
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authority for the administration of Title VII.5 The EEOC is empowered
to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment prac-
tice.'
Through its procedural provisions, Title VII specifically grants in-
dividual employees the right to bring civil actions in federal district
courts against their employers who commit discriminatory employment
practices.' Courts have recognized the class action as the most useful
and effective device for handling Title VII litigation Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides express requirements for
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1976 &
Supp. 1I 1979). Section 2000e-4(g) empowers the EEOC to cooperate in the enforcement and
administration of Title VII with state and local agencies, both public and private, as well as
with individuals. Id. The EEOC further is authorized to furnish technical assistance to per-
sons subject to compliance with Title VII and to assist employers and labor unions in effec-
tuating Title VII by conciliation or other remedial action. Id. Under Title VII Congress em-
powered the EEOC to make technical studies, and to publicize the results of those studies.
Id. Moreover, Congress authorized the EEOC to intervene in civil actions brought under
Title VII against private defendants. Id.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. m 1979). To gain the right to bring a civil action,
an aggrieved employee first must file a complaint with the EEOC. Id. The EEOC then must
serve notice of the complaint on the respondent. Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). After investi-
gation, if the EEOC determines that reasonable cause exists to believe the charge is true,
the Commission will try to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. If within 180 days from the filing of
the charge the EEOC has not been able to secure a conciliation agreement between the
respondent and the aggrieved employeeand the EEOC or the Attorney General has not fil-
ed a civil action against the respondent employer, the Commission or the Attorney General
must notify the aggrieved employee. Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Receipt of the notice,
commonly called the "right to sue" notice, gives the aggrieved employee the right to bring a
civil action against the respondent named in his EEOC complaint, provided he takes such ac-
tion within 90 days of receipt of the notice. Id. See generally Galvan, Handling Title VII
Charges Before The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 16 ARIZ. B.J. 16 (Aug.
1980); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
" See generally Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 (4th Cir.
1980) (court noted fitness and utility of class action device for many Title VII actions); Hall
v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (racial discrimination is by
definition class discrimination); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971) reprinted in
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HIST. OF
THE EQUAL EMP. Opp. ACT OF 1972 at 436 (1972) (Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare agreeing with courts that Title VII actions are class complaints, and that any
restrictions on class actions would undermine Title VI's effectiveness); Miller, Class Ac-
tions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43
Miss. L.J. 275, 276 (1972) (most effective device for achieving result sought by Title VII is
class action). But see Simon, Class Actions- Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55
F.R.D. 375, 377 (1973) (author argues that class actions lead to waste of judicial resources,
reduce federal courts to small claims courts, and provide windfalls for unscrupulous attor-
neys); see also Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (plaintiffs viewpoint), 55
F.R.D. 365, 374 (1973) (class action is only viable procedure to redress series of relatively
small injustices).
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class certification.' Nevertheless, the rule 23 commonality requirement
that a class action must involved questions of law or fact common to the
class, and the typicality requirement that the claim of the class represen-
tative must be typical of the claims of the entire class have received in-
consistent treatment from the courts.0 In the context of Title VII litiga-
tion, courts often must consider whether the typicality and commonality
requirements prohibit an employee who has suffered a particular harm
as a result of an employer's discriminatory business practices from re-
presenting as named plaintiff a class of fellow employees who have been
harmed by different discriminatory practices by the same employer." In
Abron v. Black & Decker, Inc.,2 the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the peculiar injury suffered by the plaintiff could support a broad-based
class action under rule 23.13
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Subsection (a) of rule 23 requires that the class must be so
numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Id. Rule 23(a) further requires that
questions of law or fact common to the entire class exist. Id. Moreover, the claims of the
class representative must be typical of claims of the class, and the class representative must
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Id. See notes 70-81 infra (courts have
applied varying interpretations to rule 23 commonality and typicality requirements).
To find an action certifiable as a class action, the district court must satisfy itself that
the action is maintainable under one of the divisions of rule 23(b). Id. at 23(b). The first of the
divisions allows class certification where prosecution of separate actions by or against
separate members of the class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudicia-
tions with repsect to the individual members of the class establishing incompatible stand-
ards of conduct for the party opposing the class. Id. Under the first division, the district
court may certify an action as a class action if adjudication with respect to the individual
members would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other class members
not parties to the adjudication, or would substantially impair or impede their ability to pro-
tect their interests. Id. Alternatively, the district court may hold an action maintainable as
a class action under the second division of rule 23(b) if the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate final in-
junctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. Id. Finally, under the third division of
rule 23(b), an action is maintainable as a class action if the district court finds that questions
of law or fact common the members of the class outweigh any question affecting only indivi-
dual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjuciation of the controversy. Id.
10 See notes 70-81, infra (cases in which courts have given diverse interpretations to
rule 23 commonality and typicality requirements).
" See, e.g., Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 87 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979) (court considered whether plaintiff challenging discriminatory promotion may
represent class including frustrated job applicants); Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d
825, 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977) (court considered whether class action
treatment is precluded by factual variations when claim arises out of same legal or remedial
theory); Slover, Appeal of Class Certification Denial, Reconciling United States Parole
Commission v. Geraghty with East Texas Motor Freigh Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 1 Ray.
LITIGATION 231, 232 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Slover] (certification is watershed of class ac-
tion because prior to certification defendant faces single plaintiff interested in individual
claim, while after certification defendant's potential liability and litigation expenses
skyrocket).
" 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 953.
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Plaintiff, Sarah Abron, was an assembly line worker at defendant
Black & Decker's Hampstead, Maryland assembly plant. 4 Because she
suffered a miscarriage, Abron was absent from work on medical leave
twice between the fall of 1971 and the summer of 1972.5 Upon her return
to work following each absence, the plaintiff presented her supervisor
with a letter from her doctor requesting that Abron be assigned to
lighter work."8 In situations where employees requested temporary reas-
signment due to medical reasons, Black & Decker's policy was to direct
the employee to make an informal request to his or her immediate super-
visor to seek reassignment. 7 If the supervisor was unable to fulfill the
request, he was to refer the employee to the company's Safety and
Health Department." In Abron's case, however, her supervisor neither
reassigned her nor referred her to the Safety and Health Department. 9
Instead, following Abron's return to work after her second absence, her
supervisor assigned her to a more physically demanding position."
Abron subsequently gave her supervisor notice of her intention to quit
because of the strenuous nature of her job and her supervisor's refusal
to refer her to the Safety and Health Department. 2 Her supervisor
again refused to either reassign her or refer her to the Safety and
Health Department.'
Abron quit her job shortly thereafter and filed a charge with the
EEOC pursuant to the procedural requirements of Title VII. Abron
received notice from the EEOC giving her the right to sue Black &
Decker because the Commission had been unable to secure a voluntary
conciliation agreement with her former employer.24 After receiving the
"right to sue" notice, Abron filed a complaint with the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland alleging racial discrimination."
Abron sought relief both individually and on behalf of a class which the
district court certified to include all past, present and future black




18 Id. The Abron court opinion is silent both regarding why the defendant corporation
required an employee to be referred to the Safety and Health Department and regarding
what action that department subsequently would take.
19 Id. The Abron district court opinion presents no justification for the supervisor's
refusal to refer Abron to the company's Safety and Health Department.
20 Id.
±1 Id. at 1112-13.
, Id. at 1113.
, Id. at 1098. See text accompanying note 7 supra (procedural aspects of filing EEOC
charge).
1 439 F. Supp. at 1098. See text accompanying note 7 supra (Title VII speefically gives
individual employees right to bring civil actions against their employers).
1 439 F. Supp. at 1098. See note 7, supra (right to sue notice). The district court opin-
ion is silent regarding why Abron did not claim sexual discrimination, given that her prob-
lems were the result of a miscarriage.
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employees and black job applicants at defendant's Hampstead plant.28
The district court held that Black & Decker had violated the civilrights
of both Abron and the class in the areas of hiring, recruitment, assign-
ment and classification of jobs, promotions, transfers, and selection of
candidates for the company's apprenticeship programY Consequently,
the district court permanently enjoined Black & Decker from continuing
to discriminate against current and future black employees and job ap-
plicants in both company-wide employment and the apprenticeship pro-
gram. 8 The district court ordered extensive class-wide relief and awarded
Abron back pay, benefits, attorney's fees and court costs on her in-
dividual claim.9 Black & Decker subsequently appealed the district
court's decision to the Fourth Circuit.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found the relief awarded Abron was
not clear error and thus affirmed the district court's action regarding
her individual claim." Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit did consider
whether the district court erred by certifying the class. 1 The Abron
court considered the governing principles on the right of a plaintiff to
maintain a class action to be stated in a Supreme Court decision, East
Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez.2 Rodriquez involved
the claims of three minority delivery drivers who complained that the
defendant company's refusal to transfer them to positions as over-the-
road drivers was racially discriminatory in violation of Title VII 3 The
26 439 F. Supp. at 1098.
' Id. at 1117. In addition to the areas of discrimination found by the Abron district
court, the plaintiff class alleged the defendant company discriminated in benefits, compensa-
tion, terms, conditions and privileges of employment. Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1117.
Id. The Abron district court ordered Black & Decker to develop a program of affir-
mative action designed to increase the number and percentage of qualified blacks employed
at the Hampstead plant. Id. The court further ordered Black & Decker to develop a system
of regular and intensive recruiting at high schools and vocational schools in the Baltimore
area. Furthermore, the district court required the defendant to consult with employment
agencies specializing in minority placement in an effort to fill clerical, office, and super-
visory positions with qualified blacks. Id. Moreover, the district court directed the defen-
dant to provide all future job applicants with a list of all job openings and provide all
employees with detailed job descriptions of all positions -at the plant. Id. In addition, the
court required Black & Decker to provide postings of all job openings as they became
available, and to develop and make available to all employees a list of the criteria governing
performance evaluations, promotions, transfers, the selection of supervisors, and the selec-
tion of apprentices. Id. The district court appointed a Special Master to establish the proper
measure of equitable relief in the form of back pay and benefits for individual members of
the class. Id. at 1117-1118.
654 F.2d at 953.
3' Id. at 953-54.
32 Id. at 954. See East Texas Motor Freigh Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
See generally Slover, note 11 supra; Case Comment, Scope of Representation in Title VII
Class Actions, A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS L. REV. 175 (1978).
' 431 U.S. at 398-399.
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Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, as employees denied promotion,
were not adequate class representatives for a class of employees who
suffered discrimination in hiring, benefits, and other areas., The Fourth
Circuit interpreted Rodriquez to require that class representatives must
have suffered the same injury and must share the same interests as the
class members." The Abron court further relied on the prior Fourth Cir-
cuit decision in Hill v. Western Elec. Co.3" In Hill, six black plaintiffs
brought a class action alleging a pattern of discrimination against blacks
in hiring, job assignments, and promotions by defendant corporation. 7
Reversing the district court's award of class relief, the Hill court held
that plaintiffs complaining of racial discrimination in assignments and
promotions could not act as class representatives for persons denied
employment on racial grounds.' Accordingly, the Abron court inter-
preted Hill to preclude the certification of any class other than a class
based on claims similar to Abron's claim of discrimination in temporary
reassignment for medical reasons.39 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
because Black & Decker had not discriminated against Abron in the ap-
prenticeship program, hiring, recruitment, promotion or transfers
beyond the temporary transfer she asserted in her complaint, her claim
was a solitary one that could not support class certification." The Abron
court therefore reversed the district court's class certification and set
aside the class relief. 1
In the Abron dissent, Judge Murnaghan asserted that the majority's
reading of the rule 23 commonality and typicality requirements was
overtechnical and would rob Title VII of its efficacy.2 Contending that
the majority identified differences of degree and, not kind between the
class and Abron, the dissent argued that the majority misread the
judicial precedents.4 3 Judge Murnaghan argued that Rodriguez sup-
ported the proposition that the named plaintiff must not have suffered
Id. at 403-404. See note 54 infra (Rodriguez Court's holding that plaintiffs were in-
adequate class representatives premised on plaintiffs' failure to move for class certification).
See generally Note, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements on
Glass Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217 (1975).
" 654 F.2d at 954-955. See notes 44-46 supra (Rodriguez Court's analysis); note 68 infra
(Abron class members shared common interests and injuries).
1 654 F.2d at 954. See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
, 596 F.2d at 100.
' Id. at 101-02.
654 F.2d at 954-55.
, Id. at 955.
4 Id. at 953-954.
4 Id. at 957 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (overtechnical limitations on representative status
will drain life out of Title VII). See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra (rule 23 typicality
and commonality requirements).
1 654 F.2d at 957. See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
399 (1977); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1979).
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the "same injury" as the class members but merely "some injury" at the
hands of the employer alleged to have injured the class." The dissent
reasoned that the district court in Rodriguez premised its refusal to cer-
tify the class not on the belief that the named plaintiffs had suffered a
dissimilar injury from that suffered by the class, but on the belief that
the named plaintiffs had suffered no injury at all at the defendant's
hands." Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority could not rely on
Hill to support reversal of class certification in the instant case." Judge
Murnaghan argued that Hill held only that the named plaintiffs, as ex-
isting employees, lacked the link of sameness with job applicants
necessary to support certification of a class made up of hires and non-
hires.17 The dissent further argued that the majority's strict reliance on
its interpretation of the "same interest, same injury" language found in
Rodriguez and Hill is inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's prior deci-
sion in Stastny v. Southern Bell TeL & TeL Co.48 The Abron dissent read
Stastny as recognizing that the question of the proper scope of represen-
tation in Title VII suits depends upon substantive considerations that
abstractions like "same injury, same interest" cannot supplant. 9 The dis-
sent reasoned that, because of the Stastny decision, the Abron court
should make a principled decision concerning the proper scope of class
representation only after reviewing judicial precedents concerning rule
23, Supreme Court deeisions concerning the nature of employment dis-
"' 654 F.2d at 958. See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
403-04 (1977) (trial court proceedings made clear that named plaintiffs were not members of
class of discriminatees they purported to represent because they had suffered no
discrimination).
,5 654 F.2d at 958 (citing East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395, 403 (1977)). See Bridgesmith, Representing the Title VII Class Action: A Question of
Degree 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1431-1432 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bridgesmith]
(weakness of Rodriguez is that standing analysis adopted by Supreme Court, by prohibiting
attack on any employment practice which has not affected named plaintiffs individually,
fails to resolve conflict between interest of individual Title VII litigant and interests of
represented but absent class members). See generally Slover, note 11 supra.
" 654 F.2d at 960-61. See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) (the
interest of named, employed plaintiffs in being free of discrimination in job assignments and
promotions is so different in kind from that of people who were denied employment that
named plaintiffs may not properly maintain an action for redress of discrimination in hiring);
text accompanying notes 36-38 supra (Hill facts and holding).
:7 654 F.2d at 960-61.
' Id. at 962 (citing Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 272-80 (4th
Cir. 1980)). See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977);
Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir. 1979).
49 654 F.2d at 962. See Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 (4th
Cir. 1980). In Stastny, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that neither the Supreme Court's ad-
monitions in Rodriguez nor the utility of the class action device for many Title VII actions
should relieve courts of their obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. See
East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). The Stastny
court relied on Rodriguez only to the extent that Rodriguez emphasized the Supreme
Court's belief that Title VII cases are not automatically class actions. 628 F.2d at 273 n.7.
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crimination injury, and congressional statements concerning broad
representation in Title VII class actions. 0 Judge Murnaghan argued that
the Abron majority, through its reliance on the "same interest, same in-
jury" holding in Rodriguez, ignored the broad congressional policy
behind Title VII.51 Thus, the Abron dissent argued that the majority's
strict reliance on the Rodriguez "same interest, same injury" language
was premised on a faulty understanding of judicial precedents, and pro-
duced a result contrary to the purpose Congress intended with the
passage of Title VII.
In interpreting the rule 23 commonality and typicality requirements
to require that the class representative possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury as the putative class members for the class to ex-
ist, the Abron court duly applied what the Fourth Circuit considered to
be the correct reading of Rodriguez. Nevertheless, by ruling that the
district court must dismiss the class claim if the defendant has not in-
jured the class representative in the same way as the class members, the
Abron court arguably misread Rodriguez. The controlling factor in
Rodriguez was not that the class members had dissimilar injuries and in-
terests from the named plaintiffs, but that the plaintiffs never sought to
certify the class.2 Absent certification the class had no separate legal en-
tity capable of withstanding the failure of the named plaintiffs' in-
dividual claims.' The Rodriguez opinion states that the court would
have reached a different decision had the district court certified the
class 4 Unlike the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, Sarah Abron sought and
received district court certification of the class.
55
Given the fact that the district court in Abron properly certified the
class, the Fourth Circuit's dismissal of the class claim upon finding
Abron an inadequate class representative is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.58 The
Franks Court concluded that a class, once certified by the district court,
acquires a legal status separate from the interest advanced by the named
654 F.2d at 962-63.
1, Id. at 966-67. See Bridgesmith, supra note 45, at 1436 (consistent attention to rule 23
requirements will serve to promote ends and purposes of Title VH in most equitable and ef-
ficient manner).
52 See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 399 (1977).
5 Id. at 406 n.12. See Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1977) (in
absence of properly certified class, representative plaintiff whose claims has become moot is
himself without litigable grievance, and class on whose behalf he seeks to continue litigation
has or have not yet achieved jurisprudential existence); Slover, supra note 11, at 252, 255-56
(failure to move for class certification explains Rodriguez in light of subsequent decisions).
5, East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977). The
Rod-iguez Court reasoned that the plaintiffs' failure to protect the interests of other class
members by moving for class certification indicated that the class members might receive
less than adequate representation in other aspects of the action. Id. at 405.
439 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (D. Md. 1977).
424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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plaintiff.' In Franks, the named plaintiff, representing a class of minority
applicants for positions as over-the-road drivers, alleged that defendant's
discriminatory hiring and discharge policies limited access to over-the-
road positions in violation of Title VII. 8 Because the defendant company
discharged the plaintiff for cause subsequent to class certification, defen-
dant's counsel argued that the named plaintiff lacked a personal stake in
any possible relief, thereby making the class claim moot.59 The Supreme
Court found that the class had assumed a legal status of its own upon
certification by the district court. Moreover, the Court concluded that
unnamed class members' interest in securing the employment benefits
that the defendant employer allegedly had denied them was sufficient to
satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the Con-
stitution. 1 The Supreme Court based its decision that a certified class
has a separate legal identity capable of surviving dismissal of the class
representative's individual claim on the Court's prior decision in Sosna
v. Iowa.2 In Sosna, the Court upheld the validity of a class challenge to
the residency requirement of the Iowa divorce statute despite the fact
that the named plaintiff secured a divorce elsewhere subsequent to class
certification.13 The Court held that, because Iowa undoubtedly would
continue enforcement of the divorce statute to the detriment of the un-
named class members, the putative class members acquired a legal
status separate from the interest of the named plaintiff once the district
court certified the class. 4 In Abron, the majority failed to recognize that,
because Black & Decker's discriminatory business practices will con-
tinue to affect the unnamed members of the class regardless of the
disposition of Abron's individual claim, the class has a legal interest
5 Id. at 753.
Id. at 750-751.
s Id. at 752-753.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 756. Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
federal courts shall extend to active cases or controversies as specified in § 2 of the article.
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. In the context of class actions, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the "case or controversy" requirement to mandate not only that a named plaintiff have a
case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed and at the time the class is certified by
the district court, but also a live controversy must exist at the time the Supreme Court
reviews the case. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975).
2 424 U.S. at 753. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 n.7 (1975). In Sosna, appellant sought certification of
a class including all residents of Iowa who had resided therein for less than one year and
who desired to initiate actions for dissolution of marriage or legal separation. Id. at 397. By
the time the case reached the Supreme Court on an appeal of the propriety of the district
court's class certification, the appellant had not only long since satisfied the statutory
residency requirement but had obtained a divorce in New York. Id. at 398 n.7.
" Id. at 388-401. See United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404
(1980) (action brought on behalf of class does not become moot upon expiration of named
plaintiffs substantive claim).
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capable of withstanding the Fourth Circuit's holding that Abron was an
unsatisfactory class representative.
Because the specific injury alleged by Abron, discrimination in tem-
porary transfer for medical reasons, as not a part of the class complaint
before the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that the rule 23 com-
monality and typicality requirements, according to its interpretation of
Rodriguez, precluded her representing the class. 5 In instances when
courts have limited the permissable scope of class representation in a
manner similar to the Abron court, they consistently have done so on the
theory that the named plaintiffs were never members of the class they
sought to represent.6 A number of courts have held, however, that a pat-
tern of racial discrimination creates a class made up of victims of racial
discrimination, with the employer's discriminatory intent, not factually
identical injuries, operating as the basis of the class claim."' The Abron
654 F.2d at 955.
See, e.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 809-11 (ist Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 1988 (1981) (district court correctly held named plaintiff who alleged discrimina-
tory hiring and discharge to be inadequate class representative where class would benefit
only if plaintiff sought end to on-going job-related practies); Patterson-v. General Motors
Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1980) (named plaintiff's complaint alleged facts that related
solely to his personal grievances, not facts challenging general employment policy); Scott v.
University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 87 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff challenging discriminatory
promotion may not represent class contesting defendant's hiring practices); Johnson v.
American Credit Card Co., 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978) (fundamental requirement is
that representative plaintiff be member of class she claims to represent); Bridgesmith,
supra note 45, at 1436 (courts serve interest to neither class members nor defendant
employers by allowing overbroad, unrepresentative class actions); but see Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968) (named plaintiffs, as
members of association whose purpose is to represent class, are not precluded from
representing class simply because they are not class members).
67 See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978) (named plaintiffs, allegedly aggrieved by some employment prac-
tices, have demonstrated sufficient nexus to enable them to represent other class members
suffering from different discriminatory practices); Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565
F.2d 1364, 1372-1373 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978) (class is homogenous as
discrimination in employment is claimed by all members of class to be on basis of one com-
mon characteristic, race of employee); Alliance to End Repression v. Rockford, 565 F.2d 975,
979 (7th Cir. 1977) (once common issue of law or fact is alleged by class representative, im-
material that plaintiff complains of variety of specific activities); Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co.,
554 F.2d 825, 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977) (when claim arises out of same
legal or remedial theory, presence of factual variation normally is not sufficient to preclude
class action treatment); Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes and Checkers of the International
Longshoreman's and Warehousemen's Union, 543 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1976) (class ac-
tion proper which alleges general course of racial discrimination manifested in variety of
practices affecting different members of class in different ways at different times); Crockett
v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1976) (named plaintiff's claims are typical of class
because they present questions of law or fact regarding existence of racial discrimination
common to class); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (class representative may bring action on behalf of those who have
claimed no injury and have not filed EEOC complaints, but rule 23 precludes class represen-
tative from representing those who could not have filed EEOC complaints).
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court failed to recognize that, although the alleged unlawful employment
practices were diverse factually, they all were focused against black
employees and black job applicants, which created a class of victims of
racial discrimination.68 Sarah Abron clearly was a member of that class, a
fact reinforced by the Fourth Circuit's affirmation of her individual
recovery.69
Other Fourth Circuit decisions considering whether the rule 23 re-
quirements permit a named class member suffering a peculiar injury to
represent a broad-based class challenging a variety of employment prac-
tices do not support the Abron court's decision." In Barnett v. W.T.
Grant Co.,7 the Fourth Circuit considered a class challenge to a variety
of employment practices in which the named plaintiff alleged he was in-
jured only by the employer's discriminatory promotion policies.72 The
Barnett court held that the broad-based class challenge fit within the re-
quirements of rule 23 despite the factual variations between the claims
of the named plaintiff and the class members.7" The Barnett decision is
harmonious with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Russell v. American
Tobacco Co.7 The Russell court held that an individual plaintiff may
represent a class of fellow employees who have suffered racial discrimi-
nation, even though the class members may have worked in different
departments and may have suffered injuries which were not identical."
8 Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1117 (D. Md. 1977). Cf. text ac-
companying note 44 supra (Supreme Court premised its decision in Rodriguez on theory
that plaintiffs were not members of the class because they had suffered no discrimination).
'9 654 F.2d at 953.
11 See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 278 (4th Cir. 1980)
(deficiencies in district court record warrant remand because Rodriguez precludes certifica-
tion on basis of speculation or inference); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir.
1977) (named plaintiff alleging discrimination in job assignments and promotions may not
represent class alleging discrimination in hiring); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d
357, 365 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (named plaintiff may represent class
despite fact class members worked in different departments and did not suffer identical in-
juries); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 1975) (named plaintiff alleging
only discrimination in promotion may represent class members who suffered different kinds
of injury at hands of same employer).
71 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
72 Id. at 546.
71 Id. at 547. See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir. 1977). In Hill, the
Fourth Circuit held that the named plaintiff, who alleged discrimination in job assignments
and promotions could not represent a class of job applicants alleging discrimination in hir-
ing. Id. The Fourth Circuit thus limited its holding in Barnett to its facts, reasoning that
Rodriguez precluded that any wider application. Id. The Hill court noted that although
Rodriguez limited Barnet, Rodriguez did not destroy completely Barnett's efficacy. Id. at
102. The Hill court held that, under Barnett, a plaintiff suffering a particular injury as a
result of a particular employment practice such as discriminatory promotion policy within
one department of a single facility could represent a class of fellow employees from other
departments of the same facility that the defendant employer had injured in the same way.
Id.
74 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 365.
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In a more recent Fourth Circuit decision, Stastny, the court warned
against uncompromising reliance on abstractions like the Rodriguez
"same interest, same injury" language.7" The Stastny court concluded
that the Rodriguez Court's strict language regarding rule 23, given the
undoubted utility and attractiveness of the class action device for Title
VII litigation, was not intended to relieve the courts of their obligation
to examine the facts of every case to determine their fitness for class
certification 7 The Stastny court held that the rule 23 commonality and
typicality requirements compel the trial court to conduct specific in-
quiries on the record into the nature of the unlawful employment prac-
tice charged, the extent of the employment practice, the extent of the
membership of the class, the nature of the employer's management
organization and the time span covered by the allegations.78 Thus the
Abron majority, by relying on the Rodriguez "same injury, same in-
terest" language, ignored the analytical framework the Fourth Circuit
had established for determining the proper scope of class representa-
tion.
A number of federal circuit courts have approved across-the-board
class challenges to a variety, of unlawful employment practices on the
theory that the federal appellate courts must not permit district courts
to frustrate the broad national policy of Title VII through the use of
overtechnical procedural requirements.79 In addition, other circuit court
decisions have held that the procedural safeguards of subclassification"
and decertification make across-the-board class challenges possible even
when the class representative and the unnamed class members com-
7' 628 F.2d at 273. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra (Abron dissent relied on
Stastny).
" 628 F.2d at 273. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1312 (4th Cir. 1978)
(careful attention to requirements of rule 23 remains indispensable in cases alleging racial
or ethnic discrimination); Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus. Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 906 (4th Cir.
1978) (courts should not grant class certification on basis of boiler-plate allegations); Doctor
v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 540 F.2d 699, 760-707 (4th Cir. 1976) (suits involving racial
discrimination lend themselves to class treatment, but plaintiff does not qualify as class
representative merely because of his or her race or because he designates action as class ac-
tion).
7. 628 F.2d at 277.
," See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 870 (1976) (although employer's business decisions involve individual considerations,
when decision is part of class-wide discriminatory practice, courts bear responsibility to vin-
dicate policies of Title VII regardless of position of individual plaintiff); Rich v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 341 (10th Cir. 1975) (limitation of class would make rule 23
nullity, so long as rule is on books courts should give rule effect); Hackett v. McGuire Bros.,
445 F.2d 442, 446-447 (3d Cir. 1971) (courts may not frustrate public policy of Title VII and §
1981 by development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (overtechnical limitations on
representative status will drain life out of Title VII).
" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(B) provides that, when appropriate, courts
may divide a class into subclasses, with each subclass treated as a class. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4)(B).
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plained of dissimilar injuries.8" Moreover, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the rule 23 commonality and typicality requirements to permit a
named plaintiff who has been subjected to a discriminatory work en-
vironment to represent a broad-based class, regardless of whether the
defendant employer ever denied the named plaintiff in employment op-
portunity or a specific entitlement.82 The lower federal courts, interpret-
ing the Supreme Court's broad reading of rule 23 to establish as a matter
of policy the right of every citizen to live and work in a discrimination
free environment, have followed the Supreme Court decisions.13
The Fourth Circuit's holding that the district court's class certifica-
tion was reversible error threatens the utility of the class action for Ti-
tle VII purposes. The Abron court's decision to reverse the district
court's class certification and vacate the class relief seems unlikely to
promote either the discrimination free work environment mandated by
the courts or the remedial goals congress expressed with the passage of
Title VII." Even if the Fourth Circuit was correct in its holding that
Sarah Abron was an inadequate class representative, the court should
have remanded the case to the trial court to allow the intervention of a
suitable named plaintiff. 5 The Supreme Court has held that in Title VII
8 See, e.g., United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 865 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979) (no abuse of district court's discretion in certifying class of
national scope given possiblity of subclassification or decertification); Lamphere v. Brown
Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 718-19 (1st Cir. 1977) (discretion of court to decertify class and possibili-
ty of appellate review are safeguards against across-the-board abuse).
I See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365
(1977) (effects and injuries suffered from discriminatory employment practices are not con-
fined always to those persons expressly denied requested employment opportunity). Ac-
cord, Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111-115 (1979) (deprivation of
benefits of interracial association constitutes sufficient injury to afford plaintiffs, who suf-
fered no discrimination, class standing); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
212 (1972) (courts can give vitality to § 810(a) of Civil Rights Act only through generous
construction of standing requirements); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965) (per curiam)
(minority students have standing to challenge school policies allocating faculty on basis of
race).
.3 See, e.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
915 (1977) (white plaintiff has standing under Title VII to sue employer who discriminates
against minorities, since she had right to work environment free of racial prejudice); Gray v.
Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (black employee may challenge
discriminatory hiring policies on grounds that policies violate Title VII right to non-
discriminatory work environment); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (hispanic employee has standing to challenge employer's
discriminatory service to hispanic patients because such service violates employee's right to
discrimination free work place); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (black employees entitled to work environment free of racial abuse andin-
sult); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (whether
Damoclean threat of racially discriminatory policy hangs over racial class is quetion of fact
common to all members of class).
See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra (purposes of Title VII).
See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-56, 780 (1976) (class
members retain personal stake in class action despite satisfaction of named plaintiffs in-
dividual claim, making remand appropriate). Accord, Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445
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actions the duty of the courts is to. render decrees which will assist in
eliminating the discriminatory effects of the past.6 By vacating the
district court's class certification without remanding the case in order to
permit a suitable class representatives to come forward, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Abron has failed to live up to the Supreme Court's mandate.
TOM GRUENERT
D. Proper Methods of Statistical Proof in Disparate Impact Cases
of Title VII Litigation.
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII)
to assure equality of employment opportunities.' Title VII proscribes
U.S. 326, 331, 339 (1980) (since district court has obligation to protect rights of absent class
members and integrity of judicial process, early dismissal of class claim fulfills neither,
therefore court should allow satisfactory class representative to come forward on remand);
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 407-08 (1980) (class representative's
claim becoming moot should not moot class claim); Muskelly v. Warner and Swasey Co., 653
F.2d 112, 113 (4th Cir. 1981) (intervention of class'member after certification to preserve
rights and interests of putative class members held permissable); Hill v. Western Elec. Co.,
No. 80-1279 (4th Cir. 1981) (Hill II) (remand appropriate with instruction to district court to
permit intervention of proper class representative to remedy headless class created by
Fourth Circuit's earlier ruling in Hill); Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 638 F.2d 753,
754-55 (5th Cir. 1981) (because decertification of class and dismissal of action may work in-
justice on those who may have relied on certification court should allow satisfactory class
representative to come forward); Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332 (4th Cir.
1978) (premature dismissal of class action by district, court justifies remand to allow proper
class representative to come forward); Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 571 F.2d 13, 16 (4th
Cir. 1972) (dismissal of action because named plaintiff was not member of class does not
foreclose subsequent prosecution of class action by party with proper standing). Cf. Vun
Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1977) (in absence of properly certified class,
representative plaintiff who claim has become moot is himself without litigable grievance
and class on whose behalf he seeks to continue litigation has not yet achieved jurispruden-
tial existence, making remand improper). See generally Note, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275
(1980); Slover, note 11 supra.
See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
42" U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. H,1979). Under Title VH, Congress in-
tended to destroy artificial and arbitrary barriers that restrict equal employment oppor-
tunities. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Title VH elevated the pro-
mise of equal opportunity to a national commitment. Senator Humphrey, a strong propo-
nent of Title VII, stated:
What the bill does ... is simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a fac-
tor in denying employment. It provides that men and women shall be employed on
the basis of their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens,
not as Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States.
S. Res. 287, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. RE c. 13088 (1964); see Edwards & Zaretsky,
Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) (equal
employment opportunity an essential national goal).
' See generally Sape & Hart, Title VIlReconsidered: The Equal Employment Oppor-
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practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin in both public and private employment.3 Under Title VII,
plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before pursuing direct legal re-
course. Section 706(c) of Title VII establishes an administrative procedure
whereby the EEOC has an opportunity to settle employment disputes
through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved
party may bring a lawsuit.5 The EEOC, however, does not function simply
as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties. The
legislative purpose underlying the formation of the EEOC suggests that
the Commission bears the primary responsibility for eradicating syste-
matic discrimination.'
Most discrimination in employment results not from random acts,
but rather from institutionalized practices and policies.' Courts have
tunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972) (detailed analysis of legislative history
of Title VII).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Title VII applies to public employers whose industry
operates in the flow of commerce or in whose industry a labor dispute would disrupt the
flow of commerce. Id. § 2000e(h). Title VII applies to private employers including persons
who employ fifteen or more employees. Id. § 2000e(b).
Id. § 2000e-5(e); see McDonnell Douglas Corp'. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). To
take advantage of Title VII protections, a claimant must file an administrative charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180
days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). If the EEOC finds
reasonable cause to believe that discrimination is present, the EEOC will attempt to stop
the unlawful practice through informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
Id. § 2000e-5(b); see Local 179, United Textile Workers v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d
849, 850 (8th Cir. 1972). The employee's right to sue under Title VII arises only after the
EEOC has issued a notice of the right to sue. Id. The EEOC issues notice of the right to sue
after dismissing the administrative charge, terminating conciliation discussions with the
defendant, or failing to bring suit within 180 days of the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e) (1976); see note 3 supra.
1 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) (1976). A plaintiff may file suit under two distinct theories of Ti-
tle VII discrimination, disparate treatment and disparate impact. See generally B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN]; Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 72 (1977).
Disparate treatment involves employer treatment of one individual less favorably
than another. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). The plaintiff
in a disparate treatment case must prove discriminatory intent on the part of the employer.
See id. at 803. Disparate impact claims challenge specific employment practices which, while
facially netural, nonetheless affect one minority group more harshly than other groups. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Disparate impact cases do not require
proof of an employer's discriminatory motive. Id. See also Note, Disparate Impact and
Disparate Treatment: The Prima Facie Case Under Title VII, 32 ARK. L. REV. 571 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Disparate Impact].
6 See E.E.O.C. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1299, 1301 (3d Cir.
1975) (EEOC created as federal agency to enforce congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices).
See Copus, The Numbers Game is the Only Game in Town, 20 How. L.J. 374,
375-377 (1977) (increasing use of statistics in accordance with growth of institutionalized as
opposed to individual instances of discrimination) [hereinafter cited as Copus].
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recognized that employment practices, policies, and patterns, even
though neutral on their face, often segregate and classify employees on
the basis of race as effectively overt instances of racial discrimination."
The elimination of systematic discriminatory practices, therefore, is a
significant means of achieving the Title VII objectives promoting equal
employment opportunities.9 EEOC pattern and practice suits provide an
important solution to the problem of institutionalized employment
discrimination."
°
Systematic employment discrimination is often difficult to prove.11
Evidence concerning individual instances of discrimination will not
always reveal the subtle discriminatory effects of facially neutral
employment practices. 2 The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that statistical analyses play an important role in establishing the
existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination.13 Thus, the increased
use of pattern and practice suits in Title VII litigation poses important
procedural and substantive questions for the courts. 4 In Equal Employ-
' See United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 1970) (promotion,
transfer, and reassignment employment practices, though presently non-discriminatory,
held violative of Title VII due to past discriminatory effects); United States v. Ironworkers
:Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971) (though statistics alone failed to show union
employment practices discriminatory, overt acts of discrimination and facially neutral prac-
tices had differential effect on blacks violative of Title VII), cert denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
See Copus, supra note 7, at 376.
z0 Id. at 376 n.11. In suits alleging a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in
employment procedures such as hiring, firing, and promotion, the Government is the plain-
tiff. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977). The Government bears the burden
of establishing that a discriminatory employment practice existed and that an employer has
discriminated as a regular policy. Id. Once the government has established a claim of
discrimination, the employer must rebut the plaintiffs showing. Id. Employers often resort
to statistical evidence to refute claims of discriminatory practices. Id. at 340 n.20.
Employers must resort to statistical proof in many cases because of the complex nature of
discriminatory employment practices. See Mayor of Phila. v. Educational Equality League,
415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974).
" Statistics related to racially discriminatory employment practices can be the only
available method of proof to uncover clandestine or covert discrimination. United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 9814 (1971).
12 Id. at 551.
13 Mayor of Phila. v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974) (statistical
analyses serve important role as indicator of racial discrimination in Title VII suits).
" See text accompanying notes 36-127 infra. Commentators have supported the use of
EEOC pattern and practice suits as an effort to combat discrimination. One commentator
notes that pattern and practice suits by the Government are the best means to penetrate
the interlocking nature of employment discrimination as opposed to individual claims of
discrimination. 2 LYLE, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES,
PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME 51 (1974). Another study in-
dicates that individual charges of discrimination are more cumbersome and inefficient than
pattern and practice suits. SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIV. OF MICH., SURVEY OF WORKING
CONDITIONS, A71, at 280-81, 420-Al (1970). Another commentator, however, recognizes that
government suits designed to attack discrimination in the private sector have been unsuc-
cessful. The private sector traditionally was immune from judicial eradication of
discriminatory employment practices, which resulted in pervasive patterns of discrimina-
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ment Opportunity Commission v. American National Bank,5 the Fourth
Circuit recently examined the permissible scope of an EEOC investiga-
tion and the proper methods of statistical proof in a suit involving a pat-
tern and practice of racial discrimination.
In American National Bank, the EEOC brought suit against the
American National Bank (ANB) alleging that the bank had engaged in
racially discriminatory hiring practices from 1969 to 1975.16 An unsuc-
cessful black job applicant filed the initial charge with the EEOC."1 The
complainant claimed that the Suffolk, Virginia branch of the ANB had
denied her a job because of her race. 8 The EEOC investigated the
charge and found reasonable cause to believe that the bank had discrimi-
nated. 9 Subsequently, the complainant chose not to proceed with the ac-
tion." The EEOC then filed suit against the Suffolk and Portsmouth
bank branches, charging a pattern and practice of racial discrimination
in hiring procedures .
2
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination the EEOC pres-
ented a combination of statistical and nonstatistical evidence.' The
evidence included static work force data,' information concerning
tion. Government antidiscrimination suits nonetheless, effectively can nullify discriminatory
practices in both private and public areas. Lytle, Resurrecting the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. Outlawing Discrimination in the Private Sector, 9 Civ. RIGHTS DIG. 28 (Sum. 1977). See
also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES, at 2-6 (1973); Brown, Statistics and the Law:
Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1980); Hay,
The Use of Statistics to Disprove Employment Discrimination, 29 LAB. L.J. 430 (1978); Hill,
The New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination-Litigation Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (1972).
652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1180-81.
' Id. at 1181.
' Id.
" Id.; see note 4 supra.
652 F.2d at 1181.
21 Id.
Id. at 1181-82.
Id. Static work force data compares the racial composition of the particular work
force in question with the general available work force in relevant market areas. Id. at 1182.
See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). Static work force
statistics are probative of discrimination because nondiscriminatory hiring practices usually
will result in a work force representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
tion in the employees community. 431 U.S. at 339. Evidence of a longlasting and gross
disparity between composition of a given work force and that of the general population is
not a violation of Title VII by itself, but may be probative of employment practices of pur-
poseful discrimination. Id.
In American National Bank, the EEOC presented evidence concerning the racial com-
position of ANB's work force at both its Suffolk and Portsmouth branches. 652 F.2d at 1181.
The EEOC compared the figures to the relevant market areas of the City of Suffolk and
Nansemond County and the City of Portsmouth and the Norfolk-Portsmouth Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) respectively. Id. at 1182 n.1; see Taylor v. Safeway,
365 F. Supp. 468, 475-76 (D. Colo. 1973), modified,. 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975) (SMSA ap-
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ANB's specific hiring policies from 1969 to 1975, and testimony regard-
ing individual instances of discrimination. 4 In rebuttal, ANB sought to
demonstrate that the Government's evidence was not sufficiently proba-
tive to establish a prima facie case.' ANB argued that under a standard
deviation analysis, 6 the EEOC's statistical data was not sufficient to
show a policy of purposeful discrimination." In addition, ANB submitted
applicant flow data28 to show that its hiring decisions during the seven
year period were not discriminatorily motivated.'
The district court excluded the evidence relating to discrimination
at the Portsmouth bank branches.20 The court noted that because the ac-
propriate measure of geographic area in Title VII litigation). The EEOC compared the racial
composition of the bank to the specialized labor force in the relevant areas, including per-
sons skilled enough to perform bank tasks. Id. at 1189-90; see EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Sea-
board Nat'l, 615 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1980) (general work force statistics'not appropriate
statistical group for comparison with bank employees; specialized work force figures re-
quired for comparison). See generally Fourth Circuit Review-Statistical Evidence in Title
VIlLitigation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 652 (1982).
24 652 F.2d at 1181.
= Id. at 1188. An employer may rebut a plaintiff's statistical evidence establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that the proof is either inaccurate or in-
significant. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977). An employer may show
that statistics are insignificant by showing that they are mainly attributable to pre-Act
employment discrimination actions. Hazelwood School Dist; v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309 (1977).
n Standard deviation analysis is a type of statistical analysis that measures the dif-
ference between the actual numbers of a protected minority group in a given sample of
minority and non-minority employees and the number that would be expected in a perfectly
proportional process of selection. 652 F.2d at 1191. See generally Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482 (1977). The standard deviation measures the degree of fluctuation in a random
selection process. 652 F.2d at 1191. Generally, as standard deviations increase numerically the
probability that the number of minorities represented in a given sample is due to chance
decreases. Id. The legal inference that the Supreme Court has drawn from standard devia-
tion analyses is that standard deviations greater than two or three necessarily exclude
chance as a cause of minority underrepresentation in a work force. 430 U.S. at 497; n.17. A
fluctuation of more than two or three standard deviations concerning minority representa-
tion in a work force implies discriminatory design. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977). See generally J. FREUND, MODERN EXAMPLES OF ELEMENTARY
STATISTICS 3-4 (4th ed. 1973) (examples and definition of various statistical inferences).
" 652 F.2d at 1188, 1190-93; see Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (no
exploration of statistical significance of standard deviation in range of two or three); text ac-
companying notes 120-23 supra.
Applicant flow data contrasts the number of minority and non-minority applicants
for given jobs with the numbers in each category that an employer actually hired. Copus,
supra note 7, at 401. Title VII litigants translate these comparative numbers into percen-
tages and often tabulate them to indicate general patterns of minority and non-minority hir-
ing preferences. 652 F.2d at 1193-95. As a method of statistical proof in discrimination cases,
applicant flow data is speculative and may not indicate patterns of discrimination. Id. at
1193-94. Since absolute proof of discriminatory design is absent to differing degrees in all
statistical analyses, however, courts have found applicant flow data sufficiently reliable as
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tivities of the Portsmouth branches were not part of the original com-
plaint or the subject of the EEOC's investigation, the court had no
jurisdiction in the matter.31 Addressing the merits of the case, the
district court found that the EEOC's work force statistics constituted
prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of ANB's discrimination
against blacks." After analyzing the defendant's applicant flow data and
applying a standard deviation 'analysis to the EEOC's statistics, the
court concluded that ANB's rebuttal evidence neutralized the inference
of discrimination.3 The court then independently evaluated the EEOC's
nonstatistical evidence. 4 Finding no evidence of discrimination in either
the hiring practices or individual claims of discrimination, the court
dismissed the suit.
3 5
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue of jurisdic-
tion." The Fourth Circuit reversed the findings of the district court con-
cerning jurisdiction over the Portsmouth claims.37 Although the com-
plainant filed the original charge specifically against the Suffolk branch,
the Fourth Circuit held that the EEOC properly could bring suit against
all of the bank's branches. 8 The court noted that the 1972 amendments
to Title VII broadened the EEOC's investigative powers in an effort to
eliminate employment discrimination on a national scale. 9 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the permissible scope of the complaint in an EEOC
action should not frustrate the overriding goals of eradication of unfair
employment practices." The court stressed that the charge against the
Portsmouth bank branches reasonably grew out of the investigation of
the Suffolk claim and thus constituted a single charge of discrimination
against a single employer. 1 The Fourth Circuit held that jurisdiction
over the Portsmouth claims was valid because the same hiring practices
1 Id. Jurisdiction to.hear an EEOC claim of discrimination follows from specific allega-
tion of the claim in the original complaint. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719
(7th Cir. 1969). Proper investigation and conciliation are jurisdictional prerequisites to an
EEOC suit on a particular claim. See EEOC v. E.I. dePont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp.
1321, 1336 (D. Del. 1974) (each step in EEOC administrative process prerequisite to suit),
aff'd, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
652 F.2d at 1184.
See id. at 1187.
u See id. at 1189.
See id. at 1187.
See id. at 1184.
3 Id.
I Id. at 1185.
31 Id. at 1184; see EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1355 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 994 (1976) (1972 amendments to Title VII designed to expand EEOC's
power to vindicate discrimination).
40 652 F.2d at 1184; see EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir. 1976)
(EEOC has standing to bring suit on claim of discrimination stated in charge or developed in
course of reasonable investigation).
" 652 F.2d at 1186.
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were involved, and the defendants had adequate notice of the investiga-
tion and opportunity to conciliate.42
After resolving the jurisdiction issue, the Fourth Circuit addressed
the issue of the use of statistical and nonstatistical evidence in disparate
impact claims of discrimination.43 The Fourth Circuit relied on Team-
sters v. United States" and subsequent Supreme Court decisions to
determine the validity of the statistical and nonstatistical evidence in
American National Bank." The Teamsters decision allows a plaintiff to
prove unlawful discrimination by a statistical analysis of the effect of the
challenged employment practices without requiring inquiry into an
employer's intent.4 6 The plaintiff must show that certain employment
practices have a disparate impact on a protected class under Title VII4
To establish disparate impact, the statistical disparity between success
rates of minority job applicants and white job applicants must be sub-
42 Id.
Id. at 1186-87.
" 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Supreme Court in Teamsters v. United States developed
the basic mode of analysis for determining the role of statistics used to prove the
existence of discriminatory recruitment, transfer, and promotion practices in violation of Ti-
tle VII. Id. at 334-42. In Teamsters, the Court held that a motor freight company engaged in
a pattern and practice of discrimination when blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans
were hired, transferred, and promoted to line driver positions less often than non-
minorities. Id. at 342-43. Statistical proof showed that 83% of black employees and 78% of
Spanish-American employees held low paying positions while only 39% of non-minority
employees held comparable jobs. Id. at 337-38. The Supreme Court found that such a
statistical disparity in minority employment practices constituted a prima facie case of
systematic and purposeful discrimination. Id. at 342; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410 U.S.
424, 430-31 (1971) (22% difference in minority/non-minority success rates in satisfying non-
business related diploma requirement supports prima facie case of discrimination); Note,
Employment Discrimination. Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV.
463, 465-70 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Employment Discrimination].
," 652 F.2d at 1187; see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584
(1979) (general population statistics fail for non-specificity); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (correct statistical comparison between composition
of school teaching staff and qualified public school teachers in relevant market area).
6 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15, 340 n.20 (1977); see Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1974). The Supreme Court in Griggs noted that absence
of discriminatory intent on the part of employers does not redeem employment practices
that have a disparate impact on minority job applicants. Id. at 432. The Court recognized
that Congress directed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation behind the practices. Id. Accordingly, the
Griggs Court eliminated the need for plaintiffs to prove an employer's discriminatory intent
in disparate impact actions. Id. See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 79-80
(1973).
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); see Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1974) (disparate impact claims concern employment practices that fall
more harshly on one group than another and that are not justified by business necessity).
Title VII protections extend to ethnic, racial, and religious minorities and women. See 42
U.S.C. § 20OOe-2 (1976).
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stantial.48 Since the EEOC's static work force data comparing the per-
centage of ANB's black work force with the percentage of qualified
blacks in the specialized work force showed sizable and consistent under-
representation of blacks in the bank offices, the Fourth Circuit found
that the EEOC's statistical evidence was probative. 49 The court assessed
the statistical evidence without the nonstatistical evidence of discrimina-
tion and held that the EEOC established a prima facie case of disparate
impact."
The Fourth Circuit then examined the defendant's rebuttal evi-
dence." ANB presented the court with two types of statistical analyses
in an attempt to prove that the Government's data was insignificant. 2
First, ANB applied a standard deviation analysis to the EEOC's work
force data .5 ANB argued that the deviations in the EEOC figures fell
predominantly within the range of chance and not within the range that
gives rise to an inference of discrimination. 4 The Fourth Circuit rejected
ANB's standard deviation analysis as unpersuasive rebuttal evidence. 5
The court noted that although standard deviations above the range of
three exclude random chance as a cause of minority underrepresenta-
tion, ANB's deviations below the range of three did not necessarily ex-
clude the possibility of discriminatory design in bank hiring practices.,
ANB also offered applicant flow data to rebut the EEOC's prima
facie case. The Fourth Circuit found that ANB's applicant flow data
was incomplete. 8 The applicant flow data covered only one of the seven
relevant years and the data reflected less than half of the actual bank ap-
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1974); see Employment Discrimination,
supra note 44, at 477-80 (statistical dispartiy in Title VII cases must be substantial and large
enough for courts to draw meaningful inference). Most courts do not find discrimination based
on small samples or minor disparities. See, e.g., Mayor of Phila. v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U.S. 605, 611 (1974) (15% black representation of school board panel not
violative of Title VII where black percentage in population was 34% and not all blacks in
population qualified to serve on the panel); Morita v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med.
Group, 541 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure to promote minority employee non-
discriminatory where eight persons comprised the statistical sample), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1050 (1977). Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468, 475-76 (D. Colo. 1973)
(employer's average yearly hiring of 18% blacks does not indicate discriminatory practice
where blacks comprise 4.1% of relevant SMSA). But see New York City Fire Dep't v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 392 (2d Cir. 1973) (ratio of 2.8 White to 1 Hispanic satisfied
disparity requirement to show Title VII violation).
652b F.2d at 1189-91; see note 23 supra.
652 F.2d at 1189.
5' Id. at 1193-97.
52 Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1191; see note 26 supra.
652 F.2d at 1190-91; see note 26 supra.
652 F.2d at 1190-91; see note 26 supra.
652 F.2d at 1190-92; see note 120 infra.
s 652 F.2d at 1193; see note 28 supra.
652 F.2d at 1195-96; see note 28 supra.
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plicants from 1969 to 1975.19 The court held, therefore, that the applicant
flow data was insufficient to rebut the Government's statistics.0 The
Fourth Circuit found ANB's evidence concerning managerial hiring deci-
sions over the seven year period inadequate to rebut the EEOC's evi-
dence witlh regard to this category of employee.6 The full range of
ANB's evidence, however, did not rebut the inferences of discrimination
raised by the EEOC's prima facie case."2 The court concluded that since
ANB failed to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination, the EEOC
successfully established a pattern or practice of discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII.
63
The Fourth Circuit's decision in American National Bank, upholding
the EEOC's jurisdiction to include the Portsmouth bank charges, is con-
sistent with prior decisions concerning the scope of EEOC investiga-
tions.64 The EEOC may bring suit on any claim that reasonable investiga-
tion of the stated claim produces. 5 Proper investigation, notice of the
charge, and opportunity to conciliate are the only jurisdictional prerequi-
sites to an EEOC suit." In America National Bank, the investigation of
the hiring procedures at the Portsmouth branch reasonably stemmed
from investigation of the same procedures at the Suffolk branch." Addi-
tionally, the officers of ANB were fully aware of the charges brought
against them and had the opportunity to conciliate with the EEOC prior
to suit." The Fourth Circuit, therefore, was correct in asserting jurisdic-
5' 652 F.2d at 1195-96; see text accompanying notes 93-102 infra.
' 652 F.2d at 1197. The Fourth Circuit also found the applicant flow data insufficient
because the data included the employee category "service workers." Id. at 1196. ANB's in-
clusion of service workers in its applicant flow rebuttal data was misleading and incorrect.
1d. Since all of the service workers that ANB hired in the bank branches were black, inclu-
sion of the service worker category in the data distorted ANB's minority hiring statis-
tics/data in the contested managerial/clerical categories. Id. When the Fourth Circuit ex-
cluded the service worker category from the ANB's applicant flow data, the data failed to
dispel the EEOC's prima facie inference of discrimination. Id. at 1196-97. Accordingly, the
court rejected ANB's applicant flow data as incomplete and unpersuasive. Id. at 1197; see
text accompanying notes 100-102 infra.
" Id. at 1194.
62 Id
Id. at 1201.
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 1976) (test allowing EEOC to
file new charges of discrimination is whether new charge reasonably grows out of investiga-
tion of initial charge); EEOC v. Chesapeake & Ohio By., 577 F.2d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1978)
(EEOC has power to exp~nd investigation of filed charges of discrimination to reasonably
related claims). See also EEOC v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.
1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363
(6th Cir. 1975); Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973);
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
' EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 1976).
" EEOC v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1975).
" 652 F.2d at 1186.
Id. at 1185.
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tion over the Portsmouth charges when the EEOC satisfied the proce-
dural requirements necessary to establish a proper claim of jurisdiction
over the Portsmouth bank branch.
The issue concerning the scope of EEOC jurisdiction in American
National Bank raises substantive as well as procedural problems. Since
the EEOC originally investigated the hiring practices of the Suffolk
branch only, the officers of ANB did not feel that preservation of the
Portsmouth bank branch hiring records after the statutorily required
period of six months was necessary.69 The Portsmouth branch's discard-
ing of employment applications from 1969 through 1975 precluded the
branch from presenting sufficient applicant flow data to rebut the prima
facie inference of discrimination." The majority in American National
Bank found no unfairness in this result.
7 1
Id. at 1195; see 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a) (1981) (statutory obligation of employer to
preserve employment records for six months to protect Title VII plaintiffs from destruction
of relevant evidence).
7' 652 F.2d at 1195.
71 Id. The Fourth Circuit paid particular attention to the fact that the Portsmouth
bank branch, as a result of discarding employment records, did not have a sufficient amount
of applicant flow data to rebut the EEOC's claim of discrimination. Id. The majority focused
upon ANB's data deficiency in stressing the critical importance of the Title VII requirement
that an employer preserve business records going back to the effective date of the legisla-
tion. Id. Title VII requires that an employer preserve business records for a minimum
period of six months to prevent hardship on possible Title VII plaintiffs who may need ac-
cess to the records in support of their claim. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a) (1981). Policy con-
siderations concerning employment discrimination litigation favor the majority's position
advocating record preservation. Preservation of business records prevents defendant
employers from self-serving destruction of incriminating data. 652 F.2d at 1195. Additionally,
when an employer maintains control over applicant information, Title VII litigants can rely
on statistical data gathered from these records as a valuable tool in establishing or rebut-
ting claims. EEOC v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 51, 55 (W.D. Mo.
1980). The majority's position, however, is not without problems. The dissent in American
National Bank criticized the majority's advocacy of business record retention. 652 F.2d at
1224 (Russell, J. dissenting). The dissent noted that requiring an employer to retain employ-
ment records dating back to 1965 innundates employers with an unnecessary amount of
data. Id. Additionally, the dissent argued that for courts to infer that an employer disposed
of potentially damaging employment records for self-protective purposes when sound
business judgment dictated that the employer keep the records is unfair. Id. The dissent's
criticisms raise valid considerations. Lengthy retention of employment records poses prac-
tical problems for employers. Applicant data may be in bulk form and, therefore, employers
may face costly storage problems due to retention. If a business seeks to diminish the bulk
of data it keeps, employers will incur costs to have personnel tabulate the data or to com-
puterize it. While these problems may be relatively minor to large businesses with modern
facilities, record retention may prove to be an expensive burden for thousands of individual
employers and small businesses across the country.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in American National Bank concerning preservation of
employment records is, however, consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of an
analogous question. In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court considered
whether the EEOC may bring an enforcement suit at any time after the agency has filed an
initial charge of discrimination or whether a time limitation for bringing suit exists. 432 U.S.
355, 357 (1977). The Court upheld the policy of "no time limit" on the EEOC's power to bring
suit. Id. at 366. The Occidental Court concluded that the "no time limit" provision for bring-
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The majority noted that the Portsmouth branch should have retained
its hiring records when its sister branch, which used the same hiring
practices, was under investigation for those practices.12 The court stress-
ed that although the EEOC's statutory requirement of six month em-
ployment record preservation had passed, the Portsmouth branch
should he maintained the records that might have been relevant in any
litigation to which the bank stood exposed.
73
The Fourth Circuit's decision, holding ANB strictly responsible for
the production of ANB's employment records, can be viewed as an ex-
pansion of Title VII's statutory requirement of employment record
preservation.74 The Fourth Circuit implied that the ANB acted unreason-
ably in allowing the Portsmouth branch to dispose of applicant records
when the potential threat of Title VII litigation was imminent.75 The
court noted that holding ANB to the normal litigation consequences of
the absence of necessary applicant flow data imposed no undue hardship
on the bank when sound business judgment dictated that the Port-
smouth branch retain its records.7' The Fourth Circuit concluded that if
sound judgment suggests that an employer's records may have impor-
tance in any aspect of forthcoming litigation, the employer should retain
the records.77 Since Title VII's affirmative obligation of record retention
was designed to protect plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit's decision holding
the Portsmouth branch responsible for the destruction of relevant
employment records is sound in light of the general policies of the act.
78
ing suit worked no unfairness on defendant employers since the EEOC alerts them to the
possibility of an enforcement suit within ten days after filing a charge of discrimination. Id
at 372. Similar to the holding of the Occidental Court, the Fourth Circuit in American Na-
tional Bank held that expecting an employer to retain business records in excess of the six
month statutory requirement imposes no unfair burden on employers when business judg-
ment dictates that the records may be potentially relevant to both plaintiffs and defendants
in future Title VII litigation. 652 F.2d at 1196. Although the majority failed to give adequate
consideration to the practical problems extensive record retention may engender, the ma-
jority's conclusion is consistent with Occidental and, therefore, theoretically correct.
1 652 F.2d at 1195.
71 Id. at 1195-96.
7' Id. at 1196. Cf. Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 955 (1975) (identity of labor market does not treat two branches of
business as one; branch should not have to retain records when another branch under in-
vestigation). See also note 71 supra (benefits and drawbacks of strict requirement of record
retention).
11 652 F.2d at 1196. In American National Bank, the Fourth Circuit viewed ANB's
disposal of the Portsmouth branch bank records as an unreasonable exercise of business
judgment when the Suffolk branch was undergoing investigation for the very hiring policies
that.the Portsmouth branch used. Id. at 1185, 1195.
11 Id. at 1196. The Fourth Circuit held that the Portsmouth branch must suffer the con-
sequences of inadequate rebuttal data stemming from ANB's disposal of the employment
records. Id. at 1195; see notes 90-100 infra.
652 F.2d at 1195-96.
Id. at 1195. According to the Fourth Circuit, a defendant employer may not destroy
damaging records cohcerning discriminatory hiring practices free from liability even though
the statutory retention period has expired. Id. at 1195-96. The requirement of employer
I
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The Fourth Circuit also required satisfaction of stringent standards
concerning the burdens of proof necessary to prove and rebut a prima
facie inference of discrmination by statistical analyses. 9 The court's
evaluation of the use of statistical evidence in American National Bank
is consistent with recent United States Supreme Court decisions that en-
courage close judicial scrutiny of methods of statistical proof in
disparate impact cases." The Supreme Court eased the burden of Title
VII plaintiffs by allowing them to prove unlawful discrimination by
statistical analysis.81 The Court consistently has been cautious, however,
in accepting the logical inferences that statistical evidence presents.2
The Supreme Court has suggested that comparative statistics"a are more
probative evidence of discriminatory employment practices than demo-
graphic statistics. 4 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit consistently has im-
record retention extends the statutory protection for Title VII plaintiffs in accordance with
the remedial nature of the legislation. See id; note 1 supra.
The dissent in American National Bank argued that holding the Portsmouth branch
responsible for the diminished value of its rebuttal evidence was fundamentally unfair. 652
F.2d at 1210, 1224-25 (Russell, J., dissenting). Employers face the problem of either in-
definitely maintaining employment records since the effective date of Title VII or risk the
possibility that destruction of the records will result in an inference of self-serving conceal-
ment against them at trial. Id. The dissent argued that failure to preserve employment
records should not give rise to the inference of an employer's suspect motivation. Id. Thus,
incorporation of a principle of sound business judgment into the statutory interpretation of
Title VII forces employers to make a choice between the equally costly alternatives of
record retention or running the risk of the inference of bad motive. Arguably, such incor-
poration is at odds with the congressional intent not to burden unduly employer
prerogatives in Title VII legislation. See S. REP. No. 91-1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG.
REC. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey indicating purpose of Title VII not to
discourage management perogatives).
' 652 F.2d at 1186-97; see text accompanying notes 80-124 infra.
'" See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (general popula-
tion statistics fail for nonspecificity); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340-41 (1977)
(statistics based on insufficient work force sample non-probative). But see Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 325 (1977) (specific applicant data not necessary to establish show-
ing of disparate impact).
81 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971). The Supreme Court in
Griggs abolished the requirement that a disparate impact plaintiff prove discriminatory in-
tent. Id. at 432; see Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Law Against
Discrimination, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 259, 261, 269 (1973) (documenting courts increased
reliance on statistical data in absence of intent requirement in disparate impact litigation).
See note 85 infra.
Title VII litigants use statistics that are either comparative or demographic. See
Disparate Impac, supra note 4, at 578. Comparative statistics compare the success of actual
minority and non-minority applicants to prove that the protected class is disproportionately
discriminated against. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 409 (1975) (com-
parative data concerning percentages of white and non-white job applicants establishes
prima facie case of disparate impact).
Demographic statistics compare the racial composition of the general population to
the labor force in question as evidence of discriminatory employment practices. See United
States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 116 (5th Cir. 1972) (use of demographic statistics to
establish disparate impact claim).
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posed a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs to establish prima facie
claims of discrimination by comparative data.85
In American National Bank, the EEOC presented static work force
statistics to show discriminatory hiring patterns or practices in the Suf-
folk and Portsmouth bank branches.86 The EEOC used specialized work
figures as opposed to general labor force statistics in accordance with
Fourth Circuit precedent. 7 The EEOC's data showed consistent under-
representation of blacks in various employee categories in both bank
branches for most years from 1969 to 1975.88 According to the Supreme
Court, statistical disparities in static work force data during a..period
relevant to the plaintiffs claim constitute prima facie 'proof of
discriminatory practices.8 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit properly concluded
that the EEOC established a prima facie case of discrimination when its
specialized static work force data evidenced statistical disparity in
ANB's hiring of black employees.
The Fourth Circuit weighed the defendant's statistical rebuttal
evidence with equally strict scrutiny. The court found ANB's applicant
flow data too unreliable to rebut the EEOC's prima facie case of discrimi-
natory bank hiring practices." The court identified three deficiencies in
the data that undercut its reliability." First, the applicant flow data con-
cerning the Portsmouth branch pertained to only one of the seven rele-
vant years under investigation. 2 The Portsmouth branch argued that it
See United States v. County of Fairfax, Va., 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980) (appli-
cant flow data highly probative evidence of discriminatory employment practices), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1980); EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, 615 F.2d 147, 585-86
(4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff must produce statistical evidence demonstrating employment prac-
tice's impact on actual applicants).
8 652 F.2d at 1189-90; see note 23 supra.
8 In EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, the Fourth Circuit held that general
labor force statistics were not an appropriate statistical group for comparison with bank
employees who possessed special skills to perform their jobs. 615 F.2d 147, 154 (4th Cir.
1980). See also EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1979) (where
manufacturing company's professional positions required uncommon qualifications general
population statistics inappropriate to demonstrate prima face case of discrimination);
Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1355 (4th Cir. 1976) (percentage of skilled black drafts-
men that battery company employed must be measured against percentage of qualified
blacks in general labor market to assess whether discriminatory hiring occurred).
8 652 F.2d at 1190, 1202-04 Appendix B.
" Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). See also
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 339 n.20 (1977); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
80 652 F.2d at 1197.
" Id. at 1195.
" Id. The Portsmouth branch presented applicant flow data for the single year of 1975.
Id. The EEOC instituted the pattern and practice suit against the bank in January 1976. Id.
at 1181. The Portsmouth branch had retained its 1975 records in accordance with Title VII's
six month requirement of business record retention, but had discarded employment records
for the six years prior to 1975. Id. at 1195; see 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a) (1981) (six month re-
quirement of record retention); notes 71-78 supra (implications of Portsmouth branch's lack
of record retention).
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had destroyed the data for the other six years because the branch was
unaware that it was under formal EEOC investigation. 3 Aside from
questions of the bank's lack of knowledge, the Fourth Circuit held that
data for one year could not rebut data that objectively indicated racial
hiring disparities over a period of seven years. 4 Additionally, the court
found that ANB's data reflected only 45% of the actual applicants from
1969 to 1975.11 The figure was insubstantial not only because it reflected
less than half of the applicants, but also because the numbers of actual
black applicants may have been unrepresentative of discrimination due
to a process of self-selection.96 The Fourth Circuit noted that the bank's
discriminatory hiring practices may have been such common knowledge
throughout the Suffolk and Portsmouth communities that potential
black employees were reluctant to apply to the banks.9 7 Finally, the
court found the applicant flow data deficient because it included service
workers in its analysis. 8 In light of the strict standards for statistical
proof that the Supreme Court has enunciated, the Fourth Circuit cor-
rectly concluded that ANB's applicant flow data was not probative due
to the number of deficiencies in the data.9
"3 652 F.2d-at 1195.
11 Id. at 1196, 1204-05 Appendix C.
Id. at 1195 n.14. The Supreme Court has recognized that the variable of "self-
selection" may taint the applicant flow data that Title VII litigants use as probative
evidence of discrimination. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-67 (1977)
(minorities recognize employment application futile due to challenged discriminatory hiring
practices of a business). Self-selection is best explained as the inaction of minorities to apply
for certain jobs because the hiring practices of the given employers over a period of years
suggest that minority application for the jobs is futile. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp.
97, 102 (M.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd in relevant part per curiam, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971); see,
e.g., East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 399 (1977); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 236 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1978); United States v..Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F.2d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973). As a result of minority job seekers' "self-selecting" themselves
out of some applicant pools entirely, applicant flow data may not represent potential appli-
cant pools accurately. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 365-67.
652 F.2d at 1195 n.14; see text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
's 652 F.2d at 1196-97; see note 60 supra. Since the original EEOC work force statistics
did not contain the category of service workers, the Fourth Circuit purged ANB's applicant
flow data of the category of service workers. 652 F.2d at 1196.97. The court divided the re-
maining categories of workers the ANB's data represented between managerial employees
and clerical employees. Id. at 1197. The court found that ANB's evidence concerning the
total number of hiring decisions affecting managers at the Suffolk branch rebutted the
EEOC's inference of discrimination. Id. at 1194. The court, therefore, limited its considera-
tion to the clerical category for the Suffolk branch and the managerial categories for the
Portsmouth branch. Id. at 1196. The Suffolk clerical applicant pool was composed of 24.8%
blacks, and the data showed that the ANB hired only 14.2% blacks. Id. at 1197. Similarly,
the date showed that out of an applicant pool of 23.1% black clerical workers, the Ports-
mouth branch hired only 4.3% blacks. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the ANB's applicant
flow data failed to rebut the inference of discrimination based on these statistical
disparities. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit's in-depth consideration of ANB's data, however,
raises important questions regarding the proper role of the court in
evaluating statistical proof."' The court's role as fact-finder requires it
to use its own knowledge, competence, and reasoning ability.0 1 Detailed
evaluations of statistical data, as the Fourth Circuit undertook in
American National Bank, however, present certain dangers. In
evaluating statistical data, the court risks making errors."2 Few judges
have formal training in statistics and mathematical analysis."' The court
may apply limited statistical knowledge to solve the problems in a case
without a full appreciation of the risks and limitations of the techniques
" See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (general
population statistics failed to support showing of discriminatory hiring practices); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (statistics concerning racial mix of work
force insufficient to show employer actions discriminatory); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (proper statistical comparison requires contrast be-
tween racial composition of teachers in private school and racial composition of qualified
public schools teachers in relevant labor niarket); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339 n.20 (1977) (evidentiary showing that general statistics might not reflect pool of
qualified job applicants accurately).
' One group of commentators suggests that courts should supplement statistical
analysis in discrimination cases with objective principles of economic theory. Gwartney,
Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, the Law and Title VII: An Economist's View, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 633, 634 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gwartneyl. These commentators
argue that application of principles of economic theory to Title VII statistical analyses
would sharpen the inquiry in discrimination cases by separating differentials in earnings,
and promotional and hiring opportuhiities due to different skill qualifications of minorities
and non-minorities from the differentials solely attributable to employment discrimination.
Id. at 633-36. The economic theory approach to statistical analysis is positive because it
would help 6ourts to isolate the true impact of discrimination in Title VII cases. Id. at 638. A
major drawback of the economic approach, however, is that few judges have training in
detailed economic analysis, a criticism already leveled at basic Title VII statistical analysis.
Id. at 634.
Another commentator advocates the formulation of precise standards for statistical
analysis in employment discrimination cases. Dorsaneo, Statistical Evidence in Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation: Selection of the Available Population, Problems, and Pro-
posals, 29 Sw. L. J. 859, 861 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dorsaneo]. Dorsaneo maintains that
the reason courts face so many problems in properly treating statistics in Title VII cases is
because courts have failed to establish particular standards of statistical uniformity to aid
them in evaluating comparative numerical evidence. Id. at 874-75. Dorsaneo suggests that to
achieve workable solutions to the problems statistics pose, courts determine what relevant
geographic area best reflects actual hiring practices and how much disparity between
minority and non-minority employment patterns is acceptable. Id. at 861-73. Dorsaneo's
uniformity solution to the problems of statistical proof is workable and eliminates the need
for extra-judicial training in various sorts of analysis. Practical concerns regarding the dif-
ferences in job markets, skill factors, and applicant pools, however, defy uniform ap-
proaches to case-by-case variations in the types of cases that come within the broad ambit of
Title VII.
"I D. LEMMON, THE JUDGES ROLE IN THE AMERICAN TRIAL SYSTEM 16 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as LEMMON].
10 See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1974)
(reversal of Title VII case on grounds of statistical error).
M0 Gwartney, supra note 100, at 655.
1982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
it is using and without assurance of their suitability for judging the
merits of the case.' °4 For example, the Fourth Circuit found that the pro-
cess of applicant self-selection may have tainted applicant statistical
data, contributing to the data's unreliability. 5 The court footnoted the
problem but did not assess whether applicant flow data was an appropri-
ate method of proof as a result of problems similar to self-selection.' 6
In addition, a court may rely too heavily on statistical data in judg-
ing the merits of a case.' 7 Undue reliance on statistical evidence may
result in decisional inconsistency when two courts evaluate the same
statistical and nonstatistical evidence to reach different results.'0 8
Because of the facts that ANB's applicant flow data covered only one of
the seven relevant years in question, the Fourth Circuit held that the
data could not rebut statistics showing racial hiring disparities for all
seven years purely in terms of mathematical probability.' 0 The court
primarily relied on the implications of the Portsmouth branch's routine
disposal of employment records over the seven year period, whereas
another court might have excused ANB's failure to preserve its employ-
ment records and discounted the statistical implications of the data
altogether."' Absent a neutral and consistent approach to judicial
reliance on statistics and what they prove, courts risk the accusation
that they have correctly or incorrectly assigned the proper weight to the
data to achieve a fair result.
'" The problems judges may encounter in sophisticated statistical Title VII litigation
are analogous to the problems that juries face in complex civil litigation cases. See Note,
The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898, 899-900 (1979)
(danger of misapplication of justice if juries render judgment in overly complex cases). With
increasing use of statistics, scientific analyses, and highly technical disputes, the proof pro-
cess involved in civil litigation may be so complex that it exceeds the capacity of a jury to
decide the issues rationally. Id. Similarly, judges in Title VII cases may encounter problems
in rendering verdicts when the bulk of the evidence is statistical. See Gwartney, supra note
100, at 655. The question remains whether judges unfamiliar with quantitative methods are
doing a greater disservice to Title VII litigants in hearing or in rejecting their statistical
claims.
652 F.2d at 1195 n.14; see notes 99 & 100 supra (general problems with reliability of
data).
'" 652 F.2d at 1195 n.14.
... See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029, 1031 (3d Cir. 1973) (district court found
disparate rejection rate based solely on statistical data absent supporting evidence of
discrimination).
'" See Dorsaneo, supra note 103, at 874-75 (only de minimus deviation should be per-
mitted in judiciary's approach to statistical analysis in Title VII cases).,
652 F.2d at 1193-95.
"1 The district court in American National Bank primarily relied on the non-statistical
aspects of the Portsmouth branch's failure to retain hiring records from 1969 to 1975. Id. at
1193. The district court's reliance on the policy aspects of Title VII record retention is in op-
position to the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the paucity of ANB's statistical data. Id. at
1193-95. Consequently, American National Bank is one example of the different approaches
that courts take when evaluating Title VII statistics in the absence of a consistent standard
of evaluation.
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Finally, Title VII litigants should not rely on the court to perform
various technical computations merely because the parties introduced
certain amounts and types of statistical analyses into evidence during
trial. While a court cannot shirk its duty to review the evidence and
decide the case carefully, the burden should not be on the court to per-
form calculations helpful to the determination of the case.' In
evaluating the applicant flow data concerning ANB's number of racial
hirees, the Fourth Circuit performed its own calculations to exclude the
number of blacks hired for service worker positions, a misleading compo-
nent of ANB's data.n 2 Although the calculation was fairly simple, prob-
lems may arise when a court must perform complex statistical analyses
to uncover probative evidence.'P In American National Bank, the court
squarely and correctly assessed the applicant flow data that ANB
presented to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. The court
neglected, however, to confront significant problems that face the
judiciary in translating the evidentiary burdens of Title VII litigants into
quantitative terms.
The second area in which the Fourth Circuit found the defendant's
rebuttal evidence unpersuasive involved standard deviation analysis."'
ANB argued that because the standard deviation in the EEOC's work
force data was in the general range below three deviations, the court
could infer no discriminatory design in bank hiring policies."' The
Fourth Circuit rejected the bank's argument on the grounds that even
below two standard deviations, thfe probability of chance as the reason
for underrepresentation of blacks in the ANB work force was only 5/o.11
The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Castaneda v. Par-
tida "7 to support its conclusion."' In Castaneda, the Supreme
,, Limited statistical calculations may enable the court to rework the parties
statistical data into a manageable form that affords greater insight into the discrimination
issues of a case. Just as a judge does not fill in the missing gaps of evidence in a criminal
proceeding, however, a judge in a Title VII action should not have to perform statistical
calculations to unearth comparative evidence germane to the issues at trial. See Lemmon,
supra note 104, at 63. The expectation that a judge will or should perform additional
statistical calculations in Title VII actions places the judge in the role of a litigating attor-
ney who is responsible for presentation of probative evidelice. Also; because judicial calcula-
tions are not subjected to expert scrutiny at trial the implications drawn from such calcula-
tions are of diminished value. Cf. L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 421
F. Supp. 1090, 1103 n.9 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (post trial summaries of evidence by judge permissi-
ble when underlying data in evidence), rev'd in part on other grounds, 566 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.
1978); 75 AM. JuR. 2d, Trial § 991 (1974) (jury experimentation permissible if effect not to in-
troduce extraneous evidence).
1' 652 F.2d.1196-97; see note 60 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 102-11 supra.
1 652 F.2d at 1191-93; see note 26 supra.
"' 652 F.2d at 1190-91.
11 Id. at 1192.
.., 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
"1 652 F.2d at 1191-92.
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Court noted that standard deviations of two or three necessarily exclude
chance as a cause of underrepresentation of minorities in a given work
force."' The Castaneda Court did not imply that standard deviations less
than two or three necessarily exclude discrimination as a reason for the
underrepresentation of minorities. 10 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
refused to accord statistical significance to ANB's standard deviations in
the range of two or three because of the relation this percentage bore to
the amount of nonstatistical evidence necessary to rebut an inference of
discrimination. 2 ' The court noted that in the range of two and three
standard deviations the probability that chance was the cause of black
underrepresentation at the bank branches was still between 1 and 5
chances in 100.122 Since such a small percentage did not constitute the
greater weight of the evidence in nonstatistical terms required to rebut
an inference of discrimination,"= the Fourth Circuit correctly refused to
assign evidentiary significance to ANB's standard deviation analysis. 24
Although reaching the correct result on the question of standard
deviation analysis, the Fourth Circuit again sidestepped an important
issue that the evidence presented. The court ignored the issue of what
level of statistical significance courts require to rebut an inference that
discrimination has occurred. By ignoring the problem, the Fourth Circuit
provided little guidance for the Title VII defendant in determining
whether standard deviation statistics in the range of two to three will
help a case of discrimination or hurt it. As long as the Supreme Court
and the circuit courts avoid addressing the evidentiary problems that
quantitative methods of proof pose, the Title VII defendant faces prob-
lems in choosing between various methods of statistical analysis.
The net effect of American National Bank is to advance the goals of
Title VII in eliminating discriminatory employment practices. The
court's holding that the EEOC may broaden the scope of its investiga-
tions to include charges that reasonably stem from initial claims of
1 Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977).
'z Id. The Castenada Court explored the levels of probability of chance or
discriminatory design that exist in the range greater than standard deviations of two or
three. Id. The Court in Castenada was careful to concern itself with the range in which the
standard deviations clearly suggested discriminatory design as the reason for under-
representation of minorities in the work force. Id. The Catenada Court made no findings
concerning the implications drawn from the range of one to three standard deviations. Id.
.2 Id. at 1192.
" Id. See generally W. HAYS & R. WINKLER, STATISTICS: PROBABILITY, INFERENCE AND
DECISION 218-19, 381-82 (1971).
'" The defendant in a pattern and practice suit under Title VII must rebut the infer-
ence of discrimination that the plaintiffs prima facie case raised by a preponderance of the
evidence. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). A preponderance of the
evidence translates into greater weight of the evidence. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275 (2d ed. 1972); Hallock, The Number's Game-The Use and
Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REV. 5, 13 (1977) (5% level in
employment discrimination cases considered greater weight of evidence).
,2 652 F.2d at 1193.
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discrimination facilitates the eradication of unfair employment practices.
By rejecting incomplete applicant flow data and questionable standard
deviation analysis to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination, the
Fourth Circuit has taken steps to equalize the defendant's burden of
rebuttal with the heavy burden of the plaintiff in establishing a claim of
discrimination. Close judicial scrutiny of the reliability of statistical
evidence repeatedly has frustrated plaintiffs in their efforts to establish
a prima facie case of disparate impact.1" In American National Bank,
however, the court has imposed an equally rigorous standard on the
employer for judging the validity of the rebuttal evidence. The court,
however, left several important questions unanswered regarding the
role of the judiciary in adapting the traditional burdens of proof in Title
VII actions to quantitative terms. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit in
American National Bank reaffirmed the viability of Title VII in fashion-
ing procedural and substantive standards that are consistent with the
congressional goal of elimination of patterns and practices of employ-
ment discrimination.
PAMELA ANN HASENSTEIN'
E. Title VII Safeguards for Employee Opposition
to Employment Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 provides a comprehensive
body of law designed to combat various forms of discrimination which
have infected American employment practices.2 Title VII prohibits
5 See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583-87 (1979) (general
population statistics fail on grounds of over- and under-inclusiveness); Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 340-41 (1977) (statistics based on insufficient work force sample non-
probative); United States v. County of Fairfax, Va., 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980) (appli-
cant flow data highly probative evidence of discriminatory employment practices); EEOC v.
United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, 615 F.2d 147, 585-86 (4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff must produce
statistical evidence demonstrating employment practice's impact on actual applicants). But
see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 325-27 (1977) (specific applicant data not necessary
to establish showing of disparate impact).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
2 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (Title VII designed
to end discriminatory employment practices aimed against any group); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (Title VII designed to end favoritism toward whites);
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971) (Title VII creates equal access to job market regardless of sex). See general-
ly Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protection Under
Title VII, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 723, 751-52 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gitt & Gelbfi Hunter &
Branch, Equal Employment Opportunities: Administrative Procedures and Judicial
Developments Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 18 How. L.J. 543, 544-51 (1975).
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employer practices that discriminate against workers in hiring, dis-
charge, compensation or terms of employment because of the worker's
race, religion, sex, or national origin.' Title VII also makes unlawful
employer segregation or classification of workers by race, religion, sex,
or national origin in any manner that adversely affects the employees'
job status.4 The protections afforded by Title VII reach almost every
aspect of the business community,5 although the law does recognize cer-
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). The legislative history of Title VII deals almost ex-
clusively with racial discrimination. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966). The addition of sex discrimination to the civil rights
bill occurred the day before final passage and, therefore, evidence of the congressional pur-
pose underlying this portion, which could provide guidance for the courts, does not exist.
See Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Iowa 1975)
(legislative history of Title VII unclear); Rosen v. Pub. Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 328 F. Supp.
454, 462 (D.N.J. 1970), remanded on other grounds, 477 F.2d 90 (3rd Cir. 1973) (Title VII
legislative history not helpful in establishing intent of Congress regarding sex discrimina-
tion). Commentators have advanced two theories for the absence of legislative history and
debate. One theory holds that the addition of sex discrimination to Title VII's coverage was
an act of attempted sabotage by an opponent of the civil rights bill and therefore deserved
little legislative discussion. See Kanowitz, Sex Based Discrimination In American Law III,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
305, 311 (1968). The better reasoned theory holds that Congress recently had given exten-
sive study to sex discrimination in connection with the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and had no
need to review the relevant material. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), amending Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970); Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment
Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. L. REV. 326, 335-38
(1971). See generally Jenkins, Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias: A History, A Status
Report and A Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259, 264-82 (1968) (history of attempts to end job
discrimination).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). The employment protections guaranteed by Title
VII expanded in 1972 with the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act. See
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The 1972 amendments extended Title VII's coverage
to non-religious educational institutions previously exempt from this law. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1 (1976), Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970)).
Furthermore, Congress extended the definition of employer to encompass governmental as
well as private employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a), (b) (1976), Pub.. L. No. 92-261, § 3(1), 86
Stat. 111-13 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a), (b) (1970)). Enforcement of prohibitions
against employment discriminations by the federal government, however, rest exclusively
with the United States Civil Service Commission rather than with the administrative body
responsible for other enforcement efforts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 111-13 (1972)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970)). The Supreme Court recognizes Title VII as the ex-
clusive remedy for federal employees aggrieved by discrimination. See Brown v. General
Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII
Reconsidered- The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1972).
( See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Title VII reaches employment practices of
any private employers or governmental units employing 15 or more workers. See id. §
2000e-(a), (b); text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra. Title VII also forbids discriminatory
employment practices by labor unions, employment agencies, and worker training programs
affecting 15 or more workers. See id. § 2000e-2(b)-(d) (1976). Title VII does not extend to
employment practices of religious organizations. See id. § 2000e-1 (1976).
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tain limited exceptions that may justify some types of differential treat-
ment when characteristics of the worker relate directly to the necessi-
ties of the job.' To encourage victims of employment discrimination to
seek vindication of their rights, Title VII forbids employer retaliation
against workers who oppose discrimination in employment or who par-
ticipate in any proceeding authorized by Title VII The Fourth Circuit
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). Title VII provides an exception from its coverage
for jobs where sex, religion, or national origin constitutes a "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) for the position. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). Race, however, can
never serve as the basis of a valid BFOQ defense. See id. BFOQ claims have arisen almost
solely in the field of sex discrimination since the innate physical differences between males
and females often relate to occupational qualifications. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 225, 278 (1976). See generally Developments, Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1176-86 (1971). The
Supreme Court has adopted a narrow definition of the BFOQ exception, requiring that the
defendant employer show a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all of the ex-
cluded sex could not perform the job in question safely or efficiently. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (first statement of BFOQ test); see generally Comment, Title
VI. Sex Discrimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-How Bona
Fide?, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 466 (1978). Title VII also denies protection to workers with com-
munist affiliations or when national security concerns appear. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f-(g)
(1976).
7 See 42"U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). Protection against employer retaliation extends to
both informal opposition to discrimnation and participation in formal administrative or judi-
cial proceedings. See id. Opposition to alleged discrimination merits protection even if the
questioned practice later is ruled non-discriminatory. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978). Similarly, participation in formal discrimination proceed-
ings deserves protection from employer retaliation even if the charge has no merit. See
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-07 (5th Cir. 1969).
An aggrieved employee need not show that retaliatory intent constituted the sole or
primary reason for the allegedly retaliatory action. The employee need only prove that a
desire for retribution contributed to the challenged employment decision. See EEOC v.
Kaliir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6873, 6879, 9164 (N.D. Ala. 1973). Title VII offers protection for a wide range of workers
subject to employer retaliation. See, e.g., Eichman v. Indiana State U. Bd. of Trustees, 597
F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1979) (worker assisting coworker in filing charges); Pantchenko v.
C. B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978) (protecting former employee); Barela v.
United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149, 155 (10th Cir. 1972) (protecting prospective employee).
The rationale underlying protection against retaliation relates to a fear that employer
retribution may have a chilling effect on workers seeking vindication of their rights. See
[1975] EEOC Comp. MAN. (CCH), § 491.2 at 5201, 6902.
Opposition to discrimination, however, may become too disruptive to deserve protec-
tion from employer retaliation. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792,
803 (1973) (illegal or overly disruptive conduct not protected from retaliation); Hochstadt v.
Worcester Foundation For Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231-32 (1st Cir. 1976) (overly
disruptive opposition not protected by Title VII); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. at 71-72 (opposition calculated to harm employer not protected). See generally Kat-
tan, Employee Opposition To Discriminatory Employment Practices: Protection From
Reprisal Under Title VII, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1977); Spurlock, ProscribingRetalia-
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Court of Appeals recently decided a case concerning the nature of the
safeguards provided by Title VII and the scope of protected employee
opposition to employment discrimination.8
In Armstrong v. Index-Journal Co.,' the Fourth Circuit reversed the
trial court's findings" that the defendant had neither illegally
discriminated against the plaintiff nor discharged her for opposing
unlawful employment practices.11 The plaintiff, Martha Armstrong,
responded to a female only help-wanted advertisement12 and subsequently
accepted a position as a "special salesman" in the advertising depart-
ment of a South Carolina newspaper, the Index-Journal." No male had
ever held the special salesman's position and no female had ever served
as a regular salesman. 4 Armstrong's duties closely resembled those of
the two regular salesmen 1 and actually included some tasks beyond the
duties of the regular salesmen. 6 The ultimate ceiling on a special
salesman's base pay, however, which Armstrong had not yet reached at
the time of her discharge, amounted to $27 per week less than that possi-
ble for a regular salesman. 7 The base pay differential had led the plain-
tiff's predecessor as special salesman to quit the Index-Journal upon
learning she could never become, or receive as much salary as, a regular
tion Under Title VII, 8 IND. L. REv. 453 (1975); Note, Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: Should Its Scope Be Defined By Reference To Section 7 of the NLRA, 10 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 589 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Scope]; see also text accompanying notes 84-98 infra.
8 See Armstrong v. Index-Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id.
10 Id. at 443. The district court did not issue a written opinion in the Armstrong case,
only findings of fact and conclusions of law.
11 See id at 443.
12 See id. Employment advertising that places a limitation on the race, sex, religion,
or national origin of applicants violates Title VII unless the religion, sex, or na-
tional origin of potential employees constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification for the
position. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1976); note 6 supra; see generally Note, Elimination of
Sexually Segregated Employment Ads: A Step Towards Equal Employment Opportunity,
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 577 (1974); Note, Sex Discrimination In Help Wanted Advertising, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 183 (1974). The Armstrong case did not, however, deal with
discriminatory advertising, concentrating solely on the issues of discrimination in compen-
sation and classification and employer retaliation. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
'3 See 647 F.2d at 443.
See id.
11 See id. Armstrong's duties included soliciting new advertising accounts, increasing
the size of already existing accounts, writing ad copy, and promoting special features. See
id. The Index-Journal placed no limits on the number or type of accounts the plaintiff handled.
See id. At trial, three customers of the Index-Journal testified about the excellence of Arm-
strong's performance. See id.
6 See id. Armstrong's additional duties included assisting with work demanding ar-
tistic talent and filling in for other workers during lunch periods. See id.
" See id. at 444. Both regular and special salesmen employed at the Index-Journal
received the same starting base pay, although the male salesmen received larger raises
with increased tenure. See id.
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salesman.'8 In addition to the base salary that the salesmen received, the
Index-Journal awarded all advertising salesmen annual commissions
computed as a percentage of the net value of increased lineage purchased
by each saleman's accounts.19 Throughout her term of employment, Arm-
strong received larger amounts in commissions than either of the two
regular salesmen."
Armstrong repeatedly protested her inferior job classification and
the salary policy of her employer.2 ' The complaints intensified after the
advertising manager of the newspaper assigned Armstrong a large com-
mercial account that demanded a significant portion of her time, yet af-
forded her minimal compensation. Her previous complaints had led the
publisher of the newspaper to instruct the advertising manager to dis-
charge Armstrong if the complaints continued." Rather than forewarn-
ing Armstrong of the consequences of repeated employment complaints,
the advertising manager accepted the protests about the new and bur-
densome account and told Armstrong he would transfer the account to
another saleman.2 The advertising manager immediately relayed Arm-
strong's complaints about the new account to the publisher, who reiter-
ated his intention to discharge Armstrong if she continued her com-
plaints about the newspaper's policies and practices.' Relying on the
assurances of the advertising manager, and unaware of the possible
ramifications, Armstrong returned the new account file to the advertis-
ing manager's desk.6 Upon learning of Armstrong's apparent refusal to
handle the account, the advertising manager followed his publisher's in-
structions and discharged the female special salesman.'
" See id. When Armstrong's predecessor as special salesman for the paper quit, the
publisher of the Index-Journal stated that only a woman would accept a position at the
special salesman's lower salary. See id.
" See id. at 445-46.
See id. at 446. Armstrong earned a total of $3,440.12 in commissions during her
employment with the Index-Journal compared with a total of $3,032.85 for one of the male
salesmen and $1,876.20 for the other. See id.
' See id. at 444.
See id at 447. The account which aggravated Armstrong's complaints, opened by a
new K-Mart variety store, was larger than any other account handled by the newspaper but
paid the salesman handling it only $5 per week. See id. The advertising manager originally
offered the account to a male salesman who considered the offer a joke. See id. at 446-47.
Recognizing the amount of work entailed by the new account, the advertising manager
transferred five of Armstrong's other accounts to male salesmen. See id. at 447.
' See id.
" See id. The advertising manager at the Index-Journal often transferred accounts at
salesmen's request. See id.
See id.
See id. Armstrong returned the new account file while the advertising manager con-
ferred with the publisher on the proper response to Armstrong's complaints. See id.
" See id.
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Pursuant to the procedures set out in Title VII and the relevant
federal regulations,28 Armstrong forwarded a charge concerning the
employment practices of the Index-Journal to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and brought suit in the federal district court
for South Carolina after receiving notice of her right to sue.29 Arm-
strong's suit alleged that the disparate treatment"0 accorded her by the
See id. at 444; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1627 (1977). A
worker victimized by employment discrimination has 180 days after the discriminatory act
in which to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). The charge must be in writing and under oath or affirma-
tion. See id. at § 2000e-5(b). Courts have not barred suits initiated in an improper fashion,
reasoning that the guidelines are merely directory and not of jurisdictional significance.
See, e.g., Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 935 (1976) (sworn complaint technical requirement not mandatory); Blue Bell Boots,
Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969) (EEOC investigation may proceed on
unsworn complaint); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1969)
(method of making charge irrelevant to charging party's rights). The EEOC will serve
notice on the charged party within 10 days of the filing of charges. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1976); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1977) (guidelines for notice procedures). Courts have not
barred private suits in cases where the EEOC has failed to give the charged party the re-
quired notice or has failed to follow proper procedures. See, e.g., Russell v. American
Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d at 365 (complainant not charged with EEOC failure to give notice);
Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 405 F.2d 645, 650-51 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 918 (1969) (private suit not barred by EEOC failure to quickly attempt conciliation).
After investigating the charges, the EEOC will determine if reasonable cause exists to
believe that employment discrimination exists. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1977) (guidelines for reasonable cause determination). The Fourth Circuit
has held that investigation of complaints may lead to Title VII actions by the EEOC on dis-
criminatory practices not mentioned in the original charge. See EEOC v. General Elec. Co.,
532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1976) (reasonable investigation may lead to charges beyond
original complaint). The EEOC may compel production of any relevant evidence during this
investigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1976); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (investigative
authority and methods). If the EEOC does find reasonable cause, the Commission must seek
conciliation between the parties and an end to discrimination. See Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (conciliation and voluntary compliance preferred to litiga-
tion); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) (mandating conciliation efforts by EEOC); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1977) (guidelines for EEOC conciliation attempts). If no finding of
reasonable cause issues, or if conciliation attempts fail, the EEOC will send a "right to sue"
letter to the complaining party which authorizes the initiation of a private action against the
charged party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (guidelines on
issuance of right to sue letters). See generally L. MODJESKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION CASES 82-112 (1980). Although theoretically an impartial body, one critic
charges that the EEOC overly favors plaintiffs in Title VII actions. See Gardner, The
Development of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The Defendant's View, 26
ALA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gardner].
See 647 F.2d at 444.
s See id. at 443. The Supreme Court has recognized two different contexts in which
employment discrimination may occur. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Fade
Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation" A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Friedman]. An employer can violate Title VII by utilizing an employ-
ment practice that gives "disparate treatment" to individuals or groups on account of race,
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Index-Journal, and her discharge for opposing this treatment, violated
her right to work in a discrimination-free environment. 1
In deciding the issues presented by Armstrong's claims, the district
court initially focused on the differences in salary between the regular
and special salesmen 2 Following the ill-defined procedures which the
sex, religion, or national origin. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)
(recognizing disparate treatment violations). A successful disparate treatment case must
prove that the defendant had some discriminatory motivation in following the challenged
practice. E.g., Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (197.7); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804. Armstrong alleged that the Index-Journal had
discriminated against her through disparate treatment. See 647 F.2d at 443.
The other recognized form of employment discrimination involves facially neutral
practices that have a "disparate impact" on protected groups. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (facially neutral employment testing with disparate impact
violates Title VII). In disparate impact cases the plaintiff does not have to prove
discriminatory intent. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975). See generally Connally and Connally, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities: Case Law Overview, 29 MERCER L. REv. 677, 728-32 (1978).
An employment practice with a disparate impact on a protected group does not violate
Title VII if the employer can justify the practice as a business necessity. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431 (invalidating employment test unrelated to job). To pass Title VII
scrutiny, an alleged business necessity must do more than merely relate to a legitimate
management concern. See United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (striking company seniority
system with disparate impact). A valid business necessity defense must show that the
challenged policy represents a compelling, irresistible demand on the employer. See United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (invalidating nonessential
transfer and seniority policies). For a business necessity defense to stand, there must exist
no alternative methods that would reach the desired goal with less discriminatory impact.
See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971) (invalidating discriminatory seniority system). See generally McCallie, Business
Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84
YALE L.J. 98 (1974). Also, facially neutral employment practices with a disparate impact
that operate to perpetuate the consequences of past discrimination violate Title VII. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 430 iemployment testing which continues past
discrimination unlawful); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968)
(forbidding perpetuation of previous discrimination).
" See 647 F.2d at 443.
' See 647 F.2d at 444. Until recently, in determining whether a discriminatory pay dif-
ferential existed, courts tended to utilize the standards for comparing jobs set out by the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), amending Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970). E.g., Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 355 (8th
Cir. 1977); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1971). Under the Equal
Pay Act, equal work consists of jobs which are done under similar conditions and which re-
quire equal skill, effort, and responsibility. See id. at 120. Courts have interpreted the equal
work standard to apply in cases where the jobs under comparison are substantially similar.
See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970). The Equal Pay Act provides exceptions from its coverage where the pay differential
arises from legitimate seniority, merit, or production systems or any factor other than sex.
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Supreme Court has set out for allocating the burden of proof in Title VII
cases,33 the trial court ruled that even assuming, arguendo, that Arm-
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII has
caused considerable confusion, due to the Bennett Amendment to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (1976) (Bennett Amendment). The Bennett Amendment allows pay differentials if
the differential is allowable under the Equal Pay Act. See id. The Supreme Court recently
ruled that the Bennett Amendment does not incorporate the equal work standards of the
Equal Pay Act. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981). Rather,
the Court ruled that the Bennett Amendment merely adopts the four exceptions provided
by the Equal Pay Act. See id. The Gunther opinion does not delineate the exact boundaries
of Title VII protection against salary discrimination. See id. at 181. Possibly, the Court is
moving toward an acceptance of the "comparable worth" theory put forth by commentators
that would demand equal pay for work of comparable value to the employer, regardless of
substantive conditions or requirements of the job. See Comment, Civil Rights: Relationship
of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act-New Muscle for the Struggle Against Sex Discrimina-
tion, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 554, 562-64 (1980). Although such a theory would present tremen-
dous difficulties in administration and evaluation, a comparable worth analysis would pro-
vide a much easier means for erradicating discrimination in employment. See generally
Comment, The Comparable Worth Theory: A Critical Analysis, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 627
(1980). Under a comparable worth theory, Armstrong would have had little problem in prov-
ing a case of discrimination in salary. See also note 136 infra.
The Supreme Court initially spelled out the allocation of the burden of proof in Title
VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff has the in-
itial burden of establishing a prima facie case. See id. at 802. The establishment of a prima
facie case creates a presumption of discrimination, which if not satisfactorily explained, will
result in a victory for the plaintiff. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). If the
plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to ar-
ticulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason underlying the employment decision. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Careful cross-examination of
an attempted defense rebuttal can expose underlying employment discrimination and end
the analysis at this point in the plaintiffs favor. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981). If the employer succeeds in rebutting a prima facie
case, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the legitimate reasons stated by
the defendant on rebuttal amounted to mere pretext, designed to mask the discrimination.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
The seemingly easy allocation of proof set out by the Supreme Court has caused consi-
derable confusion in application. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 4-5. Some circuit courts
have placed a more substantial burden on the defendant's attempted rebuttal than called for
by McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U.S. at 802-04. The courts required the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons stated in the rebuttal actually
motivated the employer. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(defendant must establish justification for challenged action); Turner v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant must show non-discrimination by
preponderance of evidence); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3rd Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (defendant must rebut by preponderance of
evidence). Other circuit courts only have demanded that the defendant articulate, with some
credible evidence, a legitimate reason for the challenged practice. E.g., Barnes v. St.
Catherine's Hospital, 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977); Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975). The
Supreme Court added to this confusion in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567
(1978), by using both "prove" and "articulate" in a single paragraph when describing the
defendant's burden on rebuttal. See id. at 577. In the spring of 1981, before the Fourth Cir-
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strong had made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination,
the Index-Journal had rebutted her charges." The rebuttal amounted to
a showing by the defendant that significant differences, either in terms
of experience or job responsibility, justified the differences in compensa-
tion paid to the regular and special salesman and did not amount to
unlawful discrimination." The district court went on to rule that Arm-
strong's termination resulted not from unfair employer retailiation for
Armstrong's opposition to discrimination but rather from a justifiable
and nonpretextual determination by the publisher that Armstrong's
refusal to complete her assigned tasks demanded her dismissal."
In analyzing Armstrong's allegations that the Index-Journal had
engaged in unlawful retaliation, the district court utilized the reasoning
developed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Turner v. Texas In-
struments, Inc.3' In Turner, the defendant discharged a. black worker
and two white employees for violations of company policy. 8 A similarly
situated white worker guilty of violating the same policy did not face
discharge. 9 The Turner court held that even though these employment
decisions smacked of procedural unfairness, the plaintiff had not shown
that the company's action resulted from discriminatory motivation or im-
proper animus toward black employees." Applying the Turner rationale,
the district court examined the circumstances leading up to Armstrong's
discharge and ruled that her insubordination constituted sufficient in-
dependent grounds for her termination while negating any retaliatory
intent on the part of the Index-Journal.4
cuit issued the Armstrong opinion, the Supreme Court issued an opinion which purports to
settle this issue by demanding only that the defendant meet a burden of production on
rebuttal. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Under
this analysis, the burden of persuasion remains always with the plaintiff who must meet the
defendant's rebuttal by persuading the court that the reasons stated by the defendant are
mere pretext. See id. at 253. Although an admirable step toward clearing up the confusion
on this issue, the Burdine decision still leaves considerable ambiguity on the nature of a
suitable defense rebuttal. See text accompanying notes 127-30 infra.
See 647 F.2d at 444.
See id.
See id. at 448.
See id. Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977).
3' See 555 F.2d at 1253. The plaintiff in Turner and three other workers stood accused
of violating a company policy forbidding any worker from punching another employee's time
card. See id. at 1254.
3' See id.
40 See id. at 1257. The Turner court rejected an attempt by the plaintiff to show
discriminatory motivation on the part of the defendant by statistics showing that blacks
tended to face discharge for time-clock violations more frequently than whites. See id. at
1257. Statistical evidence may serve as a basis for a showing of employment discrimination.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (statistics im-
portant to show discrimination in disputed case). The Turner court, however, held that the
proferred statistical evidence did not represent a broad enough pattern of discrimination to
warrant an implication of discriminatory motive. 555 F.2d at 1257.
4 See 647 F.2d at 448.
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Having failed on both her allegations against the Index-Journal,
Armstrong appealed the district court decision to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.42 The circuit court, with Judge Butzner writing the
majority opinion over the dissent of Judge Russell, initially criticized the
trial court for limiting the scope of inquiry. 3 The district court concen-
trated solely on Armstrong's allegation of discrimination in salary." The
circuit court looked not at the equivalence of jobs and the concommitant
pay differential but rather at the policies of the defendant that rigidly
classified and segregated advertising salesmen by sex. 5 The circuit
court held that this discrimination by classification," as opposed to the
discrimination in compensation that the district court examined,47
deserved scrutiny within the McDonnell Douglas v. Green48 framework.49
In McDonnell Douglas, the defendant company discharged the plain-
tiff, William Green, a black civil rights activist, as part of a widespread
lay-off of company employees." Subsequently, the plaintiff, along with
other protesters, engaged in a number of disruptive and illegal demon-
strations against McDonnell Douglas to protest the company's allegedly
discriminatory employment practices. 1 When McDonnell Douglas later
advertised for new employees, the plaintiff applied for reemployment.2
The company refused to rehire Green, specifically basing the decision on
his participation in one prior protest and suspected involvement in
another incident. 3 When Green's charges that McDonnell Douglas had
discriminated against him in violation of Title VII reached the Supreme
Court, Justice Powell spelled out criteria for determining if a plaintiff
:2 See id. at 442-43.
1 See id. at 444.
See id.
'5 See id. at 444-46.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976) (employer may not classify jobs by race, religion,
sex, or national origin). A classification of jobs by sex is justified only if the sex of the
employee is a bona fide occupational qualification for the position. See Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971); see also note 6 supra. The BFOQ exception is con-
strued narrowly to further the policies embodied in Title VII. See Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969). A BFOQ defense must show that the sex of
the employee relates directly to a vital employer interest. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 334 (1977); note 6 supra.
See 647 F.2d at 444.
" 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
" See 647 F.2d at 444.
See 411 U.S. at 794.
5, See id. at 794-96. The plaintiff in McDonnel Douglas participated in a "stall-in" civil
rights protest where parked cars blocked the entry to a McDonnell Douglas factory. See id.
at 795. The police arrested the plaintiff for obstructing traffic in connection with the stall-in
protest. See id. McDonnell Douglas also suspected Green of participating in a "lock-in" pro-
test where demonstrators locked the gates of a McDonnell Douglas factory. See id
See id. at 796.
See id.
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has shown a prima facie case of employment discrimination.54 Under
these guidelines, a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case'by showing
that he, as a member of a minority group, had applied for a job for which
he possessed the requisite qualifications and, after his rejection, the
employer continued to seek applicants for the position 5
While explicitly grounding its ruling on the McDonnell Douglas pre-
cedent," the circuit court modified the criteria developed in McDonnell
Douglas for discrimination in hiring to analyze the case of discrimination
by classification presented by Armstrong.57 In the context of improper
employment discrimination, the court stated that a prima facie case con-
sisted of a showing that a member of a group protected by Title VII faced
a strict classification of jobs, on account of her sex, while performing the
duties of a superior classification from-which an employer excluded her.58
Judged by these criteria, Armstrong had shown a prima facie case of
employment discrimination.
The circuit court proceeded to examine the attempt of the Index-
Journal to meet the shifted burden of rebutting the plaintiffs prima
facie case.6 In describing the quantum of proof necessary for a sufficient
rebuttal, the Armstrong court quoted two Supreme Court opinions, one
demanding a simple articulation of some non-discriminatory purpose,6
the other requiring proof of a legitimate reason underlying the challenged
employment practice.6 ' The Fourth Circuit scrutinized and rejected
assertions by the Index-Journal that significant differences existed be-
tween the regular and special salesmen in terms of required skill and
responsibility. The Armstrong court noted that all salesmen at the
Index-Journal handled similar types of accounts6' and even the publisher
of the defendant newspaper testified that one could not really differen-
" See id. at 802.
"See id.
' 647 F.2d at 445.
" See id. at 444. The McDonnell Douglas court noted that the specific test developed
in the case would not apply in every factual situation. See 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. Courts must
modify the test of a sufficient prima facie case announced in McDonnell Douglas to fit each
different case. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6
(1981); 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
" 647 F.2d'at 444.
" See id.
See id. at 445.
Id, quoting, McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (defendant
need only articulate legitimate reason on rebuttal); see note 33 supra.
62 647 F.2d at 455, quoting, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978) (defendant must prove challenged decision based on non-discriminatory reason); see
note 33 supra.
See 647 F.2d at 445.
" See id. at 443. At no time during the plaintiff's term of employment did the Index-
Journal attempt to limit the types of accounts Armstrong handled. See id.
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tiate between the two positions." Evidence that the plaintiff consistently
earned higher commissions than the regular salesmen, 6 negated claims
by the Index-Journal that Armstrong handled only small accounts with
no real growth potential. 7 Although the plaintiff did lack the higher
education and experience possessed by the regular salesmen,66 the Arm-
strong court found that the Index-Journal had no specific pre-requisites
for employment.69 The absence of specific job qualifications diminished
the weight of the experience and education factors in the comparison
between job classifications." The only qualification the court saw as in-
fluencing the defendant in its hiring policies related directly to the sex
of the applicant. 1 Retreating from the stated requirement of proof of a
legitimate possible reason behind the discriminatory job classifications
during the defendant's rebuttal,72 the Armstrong court ruled that the
defendant had not articulated a suitable response to the plaintiff's case.73
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, reversed the trial court and ruled that the
Index-Journal had violated Armstrong's rights under Title VII 7
The court then examined the measure of damages that the plaintiff
deserved as recompense for discrimination. 5 Noting that an award of
back pay served not only to deter employment discrimination but also to
make the victim "whole,' 76 the court ruled that Armstrong should
See id. at 445.
See id. at 446; note 20 supra.
67 See id.
See id. at 445. The two male special salesmen each held college degrees and some
years of experience in the advertising field. See id. at 450 n.4 (Russell, J., dissenting). The
plaintiff possessed only a high school diploma and had no experience in advertising prior to
her employment at the Index-Journal. See id.
69 See 647 F.2d at 445.
71 See id. at 450 n.4 (Russell, J., dissenting).
71 See id.
72 See id; text accompanying notes 33 & 61 suprat and 127-30 infra.
" See id. at 446.
71 Id. By ending the analysis at this point, the Armstrong court did not need to shift
the focus of inquiry back to the plaintiff to show the pretextual nature of the defendant's
rebuttal. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (failure
of defendant to adequately articulate legitimate rebuttal ends analysis); note 33 supra.
71 See 647 F.2d at 446.
71 Id. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975);(purpose of back
pay remedy to make victim whole and deter violations); United States v. N. L. Industries,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (back pay award deters violations and encourages
private remedial efforts). See, generally Comment, Title VII: Making Discrimination Vic-
tims Whole, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 109 (1976).
Title VII authorizes a court in its discretion to order injunctive relief, appropriate
remedial relief, and the hiring or reinstatement of victimized workers, with or without back
pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). A finding that the defendant intentionally engaged in
discriminatory practices must predicate any grant of relief. See id. Courts, however, have
held this intent requirement only to demand that the challenged practice be deliberate
rather than accidental. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 251
n.114 (5th Cir. 1974); Shaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.
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receive an award of back pay computed by measuring the difference be-
tween her base pay salary and the compensation that a similarly situ-
ated and experienced male salesman would have received." In reaching
this decision, the majority rejected Armstrong's request for a back pay
award commensurate with the differences between her salary and that
of the average male salesman." Although this measure of relief would
have increased Armstrong's recovery considerably and, theoretically
have had greater deterrent value, an award as suggested by the plaintiff
would ignore the longer periods of employment of the regular salesmen
and their consequently higher rates of pay.79 The circuit court instructed
the district court to add compensation for the commissions that Arm-
strong lost subsequent to her discharge.80 The court also ordered the
value of Armstrong's unpaid services to her husband's business during
the period of her forced unemployment subtracted from the total recov-
ery." The Fourth Circuit demanded that the defendant offer to reinstate
the plaintiff"2 with the back pay award to cover the period between her
discharge and this offer of reemployment.8 3 The Armstrong court
ordered the plaintiffs reinstatement at a salary comparable to a male
salesman with her length of employment, including the period after her
1972); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006, 1007 (1971, 1972).
7 See 647 F.2d at 446.
7" See id. The average male salesman at the Index-Journal earned approximately 20%
more in salary than the female salesman. See id. The Armstrong court found that the pay
differential resulted from the longer tenure of the regular salesman rather than from
employment discrimination. See id. The plaintiff only received recompense for injuries
resulting directly from violation of Title VII rights. See id.
" See id. at 446. The court in Armstrong recognized that an award equal to the
amount that a similarly inexperienced male salesman would have received during Arm-
strong's term of employment would net the plaintiff very little, given her relatively short
tenure. See id.
Io See id. at 449. An award of damages for hypothetical wages and commissions is
highly speculative. The Fourth Circuit previously has noted, however, that, like an award
for pain and suffering in a tort action, the speculative nature of Title VII damages does not
prevent such relief. See Hairston v. McClean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 1975.
In Hairston, the Fourth Circuit recommended the appointment of a master, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, to perform the actual calculation of damages when such
calculation proved too complex for the expertise of the judiciary. See id. at 233; FED. R. Civ.
P. 53. Apparently the Armstrong court decided that the computation of damages in this
case did not necessitate the appointment of a master. See generally Note, A New Standard
To Govern the Discretionary Back Pay Remedy Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 11 TULSA L.J. 627 (1976).
S, See 647 F.2d at 449.
See id. The Armstrong court's order of reinstatement for the plaintiff resulted from
the finding of illegal employer retaliation. See id., text accompanying notes 84-98 infra; see
also note 7 supra.
' See 647 F.2d at 449.
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discharge, would receive.84 The court also granted costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing plaintiff.
8 5
The Fourth Circuit based the decision to order the rehiring of the
plaintiff on findings that the defendant had retaliated illegally against an
employee opposing unlawful discrimination." In determining whether
the actions of the Index-Journal constituted unlawful retaliation for
Armstrong's opposition to the newspaper's employment practices, 7 the
Fourth Circuit utilized a balancing test set forth by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experi-
mental Biology.88 The Hochstadt case presented a classic example of
employee opposition to discrimination that exceeded the protections of
Title VII. 9 The plaintiff in Hochstadt chose to express her dissatisfac-
tion with employer policies by circulating false rumors, disrupting other
workers' endeavors and threatening legal action against her employer."
These disruptive methods seriously hampered the quality of her work
product." Seeking to protect both the rights of employees and the
business necessities of employers, the Hochstadt court balanced the pur-
pose of Title VII's protection of employee opposition 2 against the equally
important congressional desire not to overly restrict necessary em-
See id.
Id. Title VII authorizes the imposition of attorney's fees in favor of the prevailing
party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). The Fourth Circuit previously has analyzed the provi-
sions concerning attorney's fees in Title VII actions and found an underlying rationale based
on a private attorney general theory, encouraging individuals to seek vindication of their
rights in an area where governmental resources cannot guarantee a proper enforcement ef-
fort. See EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d 949, 951 (4th Cir. 1977), affd, 434
U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 1007 (1971, 1972). Despite the language of the statute which
authorizes attorney's fees for the prevailing party, the Fourth Circuit has tended not to
award fees to a victorious defendant absent a clear showing that the plaintiff did not bring
suit in good faith. See 550 F.2d at 951-52. See generally Heinsz, Attorney's Fees For
Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 259
(1977).
" See 647 F.2d at 446-49. See also note 7 supra.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976); note 7 supra.
" See 647 F.2d at 448; Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,
545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976).
" See 545 F.2d at 230; see generally Note, Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: Should Its Scope Be Defined By Reference To Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 589, 593-96 (1979) (-ochstadt analyzed).
See 545 F.2d at 226-30.
See id. at 228.
See id. at 231. The Supreme Court has recognized that the judiciary should give
wide ranging protection to employee opposition to discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796, 798 (1973); cf. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 124 (1972) (broad
protection from retaliation under National Labor Relations Act). Wide ranging protection
remains necessary to encourage workers to seek vindication of their rights without fear of
employer retribution. See note 7 supra.
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ployer disciplinary actions.93 In so doing, the First Circuit emphasized
the setting in which the opposition occurred and found that a research
laboratory could withstand less disruption than most workplaces." In ap-
plying this balancing test to the pertinent facts, the Fourth Circuit had
little difficulty in determining that Armstrong's complaints related
directly to the unlawful employment practices of the Index-Journal.5
Not finding any of the overly disorderly or disruptive conduct that marked
the McDonnell Douglas" or Hochstadt 7 controversies,9 8 the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the trial court and found that the Index-Journal unfairly
retaliated against an employee opposing employment discrimination.9
This finding of retaliation led the Armstrong court to require the defen-
dant to rehire the plaintiff. '
The majority opinion evoked a vehement dissent from Judge
Russell."' The dissenting Judge initially disagreed with the panel's de
novo review of the facts."2 The dissenter also challenged the allegations
that the defendant had in any way wronged the plaintff. 1 The dissent
distinguished the instant case from the McDonnellDouglas precedent on
which the majority opinion relied.' Judge Russell stated that unlike the
McDonnell Douglas case," 5 Armstrong did not involve employer dis-
crimination against a minority worker manifested by a denial of employ-
ment followed by the continuation of a job opening."0 8 Judge Russell,
however, offered no alternative criteria by which to analyze the case.
Other contentions raised by Judge Russell refute any claims of dis-
crimination on the part of the Index-Journal and assert that Armstrong,
93 See 545 F.2d at 231; see also McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973)
(employer must have discretion to discharge or not rehire disruptive worker); Ammons v.
Zia Corp., 448 F.2d 117, 121 (10th Cir. 1971) (discharge for pointlessly repetitious complaints
not a Title VII violation); note 7 supra.
See 545 F.2d at 233.
"7 See 647 F.2d at 449. The publisher of the Index-Journal testified that Armstrong
complained about everything, not just alleged employment discrimination. See id. at 447.
The Fourth Circuit, however, stated that all of the plaintiffs complaints resulted directly
from the illegal policies of the defendant. See id. at 449.
See 411 U.S. at 794-96; note 51 supra.
See 545 F.2d at 227-29.
'4 See 647 F.2d at 448. Although the balancing approach described in Hochstadt takes
into account the setting in which the employee opposition occurs, the Armstrong court did
not discuss the setting from which the Armstrong controversy arose. See 545 F.2d at 232.
See 647 F.2d at 444.
"4See id. at 449.
"' See id. at 449 (Russell, J., dissenting).
"72 See id. The Armstrong dissent noted that the trial judge had heard the testimony of
the witnesses and could better evaluate their credibility. Id.
"0 See id. The Armstrong dissent asserted that a male hired as a special salesman
would have received the same salary as the plaintiff. Id.
'" See id.
"D 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see text accompanying notes 48-55 supra.
'" See 647 F.2d at 449 (Russell, J., dissenting).
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as a woman, enjoyed a preferred position within the employment scheme
of the newspaper.107 The dissenting judge believed that any discrimina-
tion involved in the employment selection procedures of the Index-
Journal worked against males, who were denied the opportunity of com-
peting for the special salesman's position."8 Judge Russell viewed this
case as dissimilar to any other sex discrimination case on record,"' and
found that the only hint of discrimination arose from what he viewed as
a mere semantic difference in the actual labels applied to the separate
job classifications."' This portion of the dissent makes no mention of the
based pay ceiling on the special salesman's salary."1 Instead, the dissent
emphasized the hypothetical possibility that a male in Armstrong's posi-
tion would have received the same pay."'
The dissent quickly dismissed any allegations that the Index-Journal
unjustifiably discharged Armstrong."' In Judge Russell's opinion, the
record portrayed Armstrong as a nuisance, constantly complaining and
guilty of intolerable insubordination for refusing to carry out a direct
order.' Finally, seizing on the judicial policy not to overturn a lower
court's decision absent a clear showing of error,"' the dissent restated
that the circuit court had no authority to reverse the factual findings of
the district court."6
The dissenting opinion of Judge Russell contains a number of flaws,
both factual and legal. The dissent attempted to distinguish the McDon-
nell Douglas case1 7 and criticized the majority's modification of the test
"' See id.; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1203 (7th Cir. 1971)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (policy limiting females to stewardess positions actually favors
women). Judge Russell, in dissent, wrote that Armstrong's higher earnings from commis-
sions evidenced some form of favoritism toward the plaintiff by the Index-Journal. 647 F.2d
at 450 (Russell, J., dissenting).
101 See id. at 449; note 107 supra.
" See 647 F.2d at 451. According to the Armstrong dissent, a legitimate claim of sex
discrimination must entail concrete injury to the plaintiff in terms of compensation, tenure,
or terms of employment. See id. The dissenter saw no real injury to the plaintiff in the in-
stant case, since Armstrong received the same salary a male in the special salesman's posi-
tion would have received. See id.
"' See id.
'" See id. at 449-51.
12 See 647 F.2d at 451 (Russell, J., dissenting). The dissent in Armstrong emphasized
that all of the salesmen had identical starting salaries and, therefore, the plaintiff could only
suffer injury at some hypothetical future point. See id. One commentator has objected to
the hypothetical nature of Title VII damages, which must rely on assumptions that the
plaintiff would have stayed on the job and received regular promotions and raises. See
Gardner, supra note 28, at 108.
"1 See 647 F.2d at 451 (Russell, J., dissenting). Judge Russell, in his dissent to Arm-
strong, viewed the plaintiff's termination as a justifiable employer reaction to disruptive
conduct which burdened-the employer and Armstrong's coworkers. See id.
1.. See id.
"' See id.
16 Id. at 452.
17 See id. at 449; text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
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for evaluating a prima facie case of discrimination derived from McDon-
nell Douglas."' Courts must, however, modify the McDonnell Douglas
test to analyze situations other than an allegedly discriminatory refusal
to rehire a disruptive worker."9 The Armstrong dissent's claim that the
plaintiff somehow enjoyed a favored position within the Index-Journal's
employment scheme 2 ' ignores the blatant sexual classification of jobs in
Armstrong and the concommittant differences in salary."2 ' Judge Russell
stated that the plaintiff faced no "cap" on her right to future pay in-
creases, although the maximum possible salary of the special saleman
amounted to $27 per week less than the maximum that a regular sales-
man could receive."' Assertions by the dissenting judge that a male
employed as a special salesman would receive the same salary as the
plaintiff received"' ignores the fact that the defendant only hired
females for the lower paying position.'24 Apparently, Judge Russell
would only find a valid sex discrimination claim where females received
less pay than males in the same job classification." Such a theory would
allow blatant sexual segregation of jobs and salary discrimination based
on the slightest semantic differentiations between male and female-jobs.
Although the outcome of the Armstrong case serves well the spirit
and purpose of Title VII,"'' the majority opinion also merits some
criticism. In describing the proper burden of proof during the defendant's
rebuttal, the Armstrong court mentioned both articulation of a
legitimate possible reason for the challenged action and a requirement of
proof on the issue." Although some circuit courts have required that the
defendant prove the explanations presented on rebuttal,"8 the Supreme
Court specifically has stated that the burden that shifts to the defendant
after a successful showing of a prima facie case amounts only to a show-
ing putting forth a believable reason that may have motivated the
employment practice in question."' The Fourth Circuit's statements con-
,, See 647 F.2d at 449; text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
11 See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, n.13; note 56 supra.
'2 See 647 F.2d at 449 (Russell, J., dissenting); text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
" See 647 F.2d at 444; text accompanying note 17 supra.
647 F.2d at 451 (Russell, J., dissenting); note 119 supra.
See 647 F.2d at 451 (Russell, J., dissenting); text accompanying note 110 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 12, 14 supra.
121 See 647 F.2d at 449-52 (Russell, J.,- dissenting).
" See note 2 supra.
' 647 F.2d at 445; see text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
' See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245, n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Turner v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541
F.2d 394, 399 (3rd Cir. 1976); note 33 supra.
" See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see note
33 supra. The Supreme Court, in Burdine dismissed fears that a requirement of mere articu-
lation on rebuttal would lead to fictitious explanations by defendants. See 450 U.S. at 258.
Given the liberality of federal discovery rules and the theoretic ease with which a plaintiff
can expose a bogus explanation of a challenged business practice, the Burdine Court felt
that the requirement of articulation on rebuttal sufficiently protects plaintiffs' interests in
Title VII cases. See id.
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cerning the necessity of proof on rebuttal made no difference in Arm-
strong, since the defendant failed even to articulate a credible
rebuttal. 13 1 In future cases, where the defendant may have a stronger
argument to rebut the plaintiff's case than in Armstrong, the Fourth Cir-
cuit will need to take notice of recent Supreme Court precedents defin-
ing the scope of defendants' rebuttal and tailor the analysis accordingly.
Another, and perhaps more troubling, aspect of the Armstrong opin-
ion rests in the court's unwillingness to accept the case as one dealing
with discrimination in salary. 13' Rather than treating the case in the man-
ner in which the plaintiff argued before the trial court and briefed the
circuit court,'32 the Fourth Circuit based the decision on discrimination in
classification.'3 3 Considering the almost total congruence between the
duties of the two types of salesmen, the court could have based its deci-
sion on the discrimination in salary issue presented by the plaintiff and
rejected by the trial court.' In doing so, the Fourth Circuit would have
recognized that women workers often receive lower wages for work of
equal or greater value than that which males perform. 35 An adoption of a
"comparable worth" theory for salary discrimination claims would repre-
sent a quantum leap forward in the struggle against discrimination.'38
Courts must begin comparing the actual value of work performed by
males and females and evaluating Title VII suits within such a frame-
work if traditional patterns of employment discrimination are ever going
to be eliminated. Instead, the Armstrong court first criticized the lower
tribunal for overly narrowing the case by concentrating on an allegedly
unfair pay difference between almost identical jobs,'37 then proceeded to
133 See 647 F.2d at 446; text accompanying note 73 supra.
,31 See 647 F.2d at 444; text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
' See Brief for Appellant at 30, Armstrong v. Index-Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441 (4th Cir.
1981).
'3 See 647 F.2d at 444-46.
" See id. at 444.
'35 See Comment, Civil Rights: Relationship of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act-New
Muscle for the Struggle Against Sex Discrimination, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 554, 560-64 (1980).
As of 1978, the average female in the American work force received 60% of the salary
received by the average male worker. See Rytina, Occupational Segregation and Earnings
Differences By Sex, 104 MON. LAB. REV. 49, 49 (Jan. 1981).
" See generally Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979). A comparable worth theory,
demanding equal pay for jobs of comparable worth of employers, regardless of traditional
pay scales and job status, could prove quite dangerous. See Lemons v. City of County of
Denver, 17 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 907 (D. Colo., April 28, 1978)
(comparable worth theory impractical and disruptive); Nelson, Opton, & Wilson, Wage
Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory In Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REV.
233, 293-94 (1980) (comparable worth theory highly inflationary). Fears that a comparable
worth theory, directly comparing the ultimate value of different jobs, could prove disrup-
tive and difficult in application could have motivated the Armstrong courts decision to treat
the plaintiffs charges in terms of a discriminatory classification scheme instead of a
discriminatory compensation analysis. See note 32 supra.
13 See 647 F.2d at 444-46.
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